tv C-SPAN Weekend CSPAN June 19, 2010 10:00am-2:00pm EDT
with this greatly reduce military spending if you no longer need manned fighters, bombers, or aircraft carriers? this would limit a loss of life. thank you. guest: i would think the last part first. in a loss of life, one reason why law enforcement wants to use this is exactly that. if you have suspects fleeing a car chase or something, if you can use these maybe it is less dangerous to keep the suspect in sight than having the police officer drive at really high speeds and possibly have an accident. another thing they are thinking of with the small drones or unmanned aircraft is to send them if you have a swat situation to send them in the head of the police with cameras to try and spot where the
suspects are hiding so that you can hopefully reduce officers getting killed or injured. there are ways that they may be lifesaving. host: we will leave it there. joan lowy from the associated press. thank you for being with us. coming up tomorrow on "washington journal," james wakley -- weakly, brian fishman of the new american foundation will be talking about afghanistan, and carrie severino who is the chief counsel and policy director who will speak to us about opposition to the nomination of the elena kagan to the u.s. supreme court.
>> that is at 10:45 eastern here on c-span. >> our public affairs content is available on television, radio, and on line. you cannot connect to the sun twitter, facebook, and u2. signup for our schedule alert e- mails. >> secretary of state hillary clinton said thursday that a new ratified start treaty could lead to talks on russia on missile but -- missile defense and iran. the chairman of the joint chiefs. this hearing is about two hours
and 20 minutes. it is a real pleasure to have all of you with us this morning. this is his first appearance before the committee and i believe it is. he did a special welcome for that. the new strategic arms reduction treaty that is before us today is in a important treaty. it will make our country more secure and advance our core national security interest. this treaty is in keeping with the long tradition of bilateral,
verifiable, arms control agreements with russia. the united states senate has previously approved attend bilateral arms control agreements with russia would overwhelmingly bipartisan majorities. only one was supposed by more than six votes. that was in 1993. three of these treaties were considered during some of the most difficult days of the cold war and they were all approved by overwhelming support. this new start treaty supports a credible nuclear deterrent and maintains the nuclear triad while allowing both the united states and russia to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons. between them, the united states and russia have more than 90% of
the world's nuclear weapons. while each country clearly has more weapons than needed, productions will happen only through treaties, as neither side wants to be unilaterally disarming. it this new treaty will help ensure that needed reductions continue one measured step at a time. reductions in both nations nuclear inventories are also required by the nuclear non- proliferation treaty. that is a treaty that we strive to have not nuclear weapons adhere to. this treaty continues the reduction started in the moscow treaty, which president george w. bush negotiated. i'd like the moscow treaty, however, this treaty is a verifiable treaty with inspections and other mechanisms that will ensure transparency in the nuclear arsenals of each side. this tribute will continue --
this tree will continue the means to allow both the united states and russia up to monitor each other's nuclear systems. this new treaty and the attention that president obama has brought to the threat from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials are critically important. the proliferation threat is real and includes the possibility that nuclear weapons and materials could fall into the hands of terrorists or others who wish to threaten the use of nuclear materials. through this treaty, these dangers will be reduced. fundamentally, this treaty is a treaty that limits strategic offensive nuclear arms. it does not lament anything else. some might want it to limit more, some might fear that it does limit more, but it does not.
a unilateral statement made by russia concerning missile defense does not limit or constrain our mission -- missile defense efforts. a u.s. unilateral statement makes it clear that our missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with russia and the united states missile defense systems would be employed to defend the united states against limited missile launches and to defend its deployed forces, allies, and partners against regional threats. the united states intends to
continue improving and applying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and is part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions. the unilateral statement of the united states will make -- will be made part of the record to this point. while the united states must maintain the stockpile with or without this treaty, this treaty does bring renewed attention to that nuclear stockpile. this new focus on maintaining the nuclear stockpile through increased scientific and technical rigor insurers a credible nuclear deterrent and paves the way to future reductions. in the early days, and significant strides were made in the ability of the nuclear weapons complex to maintain its nuclear weapons without testing. it has been almost 18 years since the last explosive nuclear weapons test was conducted and
still the stock paul remains safe, secure, and reliable. -- the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. president obama, secretary gates, secretary clinton have laid out a plan to increase funding for the nuclear weapons complex and ensure a robust capability for the foreseeable future. the former administrator of the national nuclear security and the station has said that he will surely welcome the budget as robust as this budget plan for the obama administration. we look forward to a good discussion of all of these issues with our distinguished witnesses. i call upon senator mccain. >> i think our distinguished witnesses for their service to our country and joining us today
to discuss the new start treaty and its implications for national security. my years in the senate, i have supported previous bipartisan efforts to reduce our nuclear weapons in step with the russian government and i have been proud to do so. as we evaluate the new start treaty and consider how to vote on it, i think there are three areas of concern that need to be resolved. first, we need to be confident that the treaty is verifiable and we will have a better sense of that once the congress receives the new national intelligence estimate. we need to be confident that the treaty in no way limits the administration's ability and willingness to deploy a missile defense capabilities regardless of the statements made by the russian government. finally, we need to be confident that any future reductions in our nuclear stockpile will be accompanied by a serious long- term commitment to modernizing our nuclear stockpile so that we
can have confidence in its safety, security, and reliability. on missile defense, as we are all aware, the concern that the new start treaty could constrain our capabilities is an issue of significant importance. secretary gates, you've been quite clear that the treaty will not constrain the united states from deploying the most effective missile defense as possible, nor imposed additional barriers on those defenses. all such assurances are welcome, they do not change the fact that the treaty text includes a clear legally binding limitation on our missile defense options. this may not be a meaningful limitations, but it is impossible to deny that it is a limitation. i continue to have serious concerns about why the administration agreed to this language in the treaty text after telling the congress
repeatedly during the negotiations that they would do no such thing. i fear it could fuel russia's clear desire to establish unfounded linkages between offensive and defensive weapons. i look forward to discussing rationale behind the trees references to missile defense and as we do, i would reiterate that i am -- any notion of a russian and veto power on decisions on missile defense architecture is unacceptable. we should oppose any attempts by any administration to do so. as part of the head of illustrations new start treaty -- for fiscal year 2010, the bill required a report on the plan for modernizing their nuclear weapons complex and delivery vehicles. with respect to the nuclear weapons complex, i am spectacle -- skeptical that the 10-year funding plan adequately
addresses the recapitalization needs for the weapons complex. the double counting of funds combining those already planned for sustainment of the modernization efforts pence a misleading picture. $80 billion over the next 10 years is a substantial sum. however, only a fraction of that amount is actually above what would be allocated simply to sustain the current stockpile. given the long-term neglect of the past decade, it is imperative that our investment fills our immediate and future national security needs. the administration's funding proposal established inadequate baseline and while more funding is more likely meeting, affordability must be closely scrutinized. apelike check is not the appropriate way to recap -- a blank check is not the proper way to recapitalize.
this future financial commitment is daunting sama -- a daunting. we must have a clear understanding of these priorities from this administration as well as a commitment that such investments will be represented in forthcoming budget requests. let me conclude by saying that this treaty will have implications on our nuclear structure and i look forward to hearing additional details on the composition of our strategic forces from our witnesses this morning. >> thank you very much, senator mccain. let me start with secretary clinton. >> thank you very much. it is a great pleasure for me to return to testify before a committee that was very honored
to serve on. we are here today because we share a strong belief that the new start treaty will make our country more secure and we urge the senate to ratify it expeditiously. i note that some argue that we do not need a new start treaty, but let's be clear about the choice before us. it is between this treaty and no obligation for russia to keep its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level. between this treaty and no on the ground verification of russia's strategic forces. as secretary gates, every previous president of both parties who faced this choice has concluded that the united states is better off with a treaty that without one. the united states senate has always agreed.
more than two years ago, president bush began this process that led to this treaty that we are discussing today. the new start treaty has already received broad bipartisan endorsement bread as james s. schlesinger -- endorsed a. as james s. schlesinger declared recently in his congressional testimony, it is obligatory for the united states to ratify. why do so many people who have studied this issue over 70 years, and from opposite ends of the political spectrum agree so strongly? today, i would like to discuss briefly what the new start treaty is and also what it is not. this is a treaty that will provide stability, transparency, and predictability for the two countries with more than 90% of the world's nuclear
weapons. it is a treaty that will reduce the permissible number of russian and u.s. deployed strategic warheads to 1550. a level not seen since the 1950's. in addition, each country will be limited to 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers. and these limits will help the united states and russia at bring our deployed strategic arsenals, which were size for the cold war, to levels that are more appropriate for today's threats. this is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons with an extensive verification regime. this regime draws upon our experience over the last 15 years in implementing the original start treaty. the verification provisions
reflect today's realities including the much smaller numbers of facilities in russia compared with the former soviet union. for the first time, we will be monitoring the actual numbers of warheads on deployed strategic missiles. by bringing the new start treaty into force, we will strengthen our national security more broadly, including by creating greater leverage to tackle a court national security challenge, a nuclear proliferation. this will also demonstrate our leadership and strengthen our hand as the work with others to hold irresponsible governments accountable. it makes clear that we are committed to real production, upholding our end of the bargain under the non-proliferation treaty, which is already brought
about important benefits in my discussions with foreign leaders about strengthening the non-proliferation regime and a range of other topics. i want to be clear. there are numerous things this treaty will not do. as secretary gates will discuss more fully, then you start treat had not compromised the nuclear force levels we need to protect ourselves and our allies. it does not infringe -- this does not constrain our missile defense efforts. i want to underscore this. i know there has been a lot of concern about this. i anticipate a lot of questions. this is something that this committee recently reiterated in the fy11 bill.
it is the sense of congress that there are no constraints contained in the new start treaty on the developments or the deployment by the united states of the fact of missile defenses, including all phases of the phase adaptec approach to missile defense in europe. i worked with 71 this committee when i have the honor of serving in the senate. on behalf of a very strong missile defense system. i want to make this clear -- this point very clearly. russia has issued a unilateral statement expressing its views. that is not an agreed upon of view. that is not in the treaty. it is the equivalent of a press release and we are not bound by it. in fact, we have issued our own
statement making clear that the united states intends to continue at to improve and deployed effective missile defense systems. the treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces, but that is a statement of fact. it does not constrain our missile defense program. the treaty also includes language -- and i think that this is senator mccain's reference to article 5 -- prohibiting the use of defensive missile launches. -- launchers. we had no intention of doing that anyway. as general all riley -- general all riley has made clear in testimony, we reached the conclusion that it is actually cheaper to build smaller, tailor-made missile defense silo's than to confirm it -- and
to convert defense of launchers. we could've had a long list. we're not going to launch from any moving vehicle, like a car or truck breakout. we could have set a lot of things that we're not going to do. the fact is that we were not going to do them. as the treaty does not restrict us in any way from building new missile defense launchers, 14 of which are currently being constructed in alaska. the very fact on the ground refute any argument to the contrary. the obama administration has requested $9.9 billion for missile defense in fy11. the new start treaty does not restrict our ability to modernize our nuclear weapons complex to maintain a safe, secure deterrent.
this administration has called for a 10% increase for overall weapons and infrastructure activities in a time of very serious budget constraints. we called for a 25% increase in direct stockpile work. during the next 10 years, this administration proposes investing $80 billion in our nuclear weapons complex. let me just conclude by taking a step back and putting the new start treaty into a larger context. this treaty is one part of a broader effort to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest weapons the world has ever known, especially the potential intersection of violent extremism and nuclear proliferation. we have several coordinated efforts that have been briefed to this committee.
while a ratified new start treaty stand on its own terms, and when you look at the very real benefits it provides to our national security, it is part of a broader strategy. we stand ready to work with you as you undertake your constitutional responsibilities with respect to this treaty and we are ready to answer any and all questions and we hope that at the end of your deliberations, you'll come to the same conclusion that we and many others have reached, including many others who have sat in these chairs and voted in the senate chamber, that this treaty makes our country more secure. thank you. >> secretary gates. >> thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the new
treaty between the united states and russia. an agreement that reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a manner that strengthens the stability of our relationship and protect the security of the american people. america's nuclear arsenal remains a fight a pillar of our national security, deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners. the first that of the year-long nuclear posture review was an extensive analysis, which determines how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. this provided the basis for negotiation of new start. the result of the studies give me confidence that the department of defense will be able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing our weapons to ensure that they're safe, secure, and reliable. the u.s. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on the triad of delivery
systems. under this treaty, we retain the power and the freedom to determine the composition of our force structure, allowing the united states complete flexibility to modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protect our national security interest. the defense department has established a base line structure to guide our planet, one that does not require changes to current arrangements. the department will retain 240
deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles distributed among 14 submarines, each of which will have 20 launch tubes. this is the most survivable leg of the triad. we will retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers. the u.s. will retain up to 420 deployed single warheads. let me address some of the things that the treaty -- the treaty will not affect. the treaty will not constrain the united states from deploying the most effective missile defense is possible. nor impose additional costs are barriers on the defenses. i remain confident in the u.s. missile defense program, which has made considerable advancements. as the administration ballistic review and budget plan made clear, the united states will
continue to improve our capability to defend ourselves against ballistic missile threats. our request for a missile defense in the 11 budget is $700 million over the 2010 number and we are looking at an increase beyond that of up to $1 billion for two dozen 12. we've made all of this clear to the -- fy12. it is not surprising that russia continues to object to our missile defense program. the russians know better missile defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by a country like north korea or iran. they do not have the capability to defend against the russian federation large advance arsenal. u.s. missile defenses do not and
will not affect russia's strategic deterrent. to build such a capability, and missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980's, its technological lead unfeasible and destabilizing. therefore, we have no plans to do so. we are discussing missile defense cooperation with russia, which we believe is in the interest of both nations. such talks have nothing to do with imposing any limitations on our programs or deployment plans. furthermore, the new start treaty does that restrict our ability to deploy conventional strike capabilities. they can attack targets anywhere on the globe. the treaty's limits of 700 deployed combined with a ceiling of 1550 and deployed warheads accommodates a limited number of conventional warheads that we might need for this capability. we are currently examining the future global strike systems
that would not be limited by this treaty. in my view, a key contribution is its provision for a strong and verification regime. while the intelligence committee will provide a detailed assessment, i would like to synthesize some of the key elements of this regime. they will monitor russia's compliance with the treaty. the treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each year at operating basis. the agreement establishes a database updated every six months which will help provide the united states within the overall picture of russia's strategic forces. unique identifiers for the first time will be assigned to each heavy bomber, allowing us to track accountable systems to
allow their life cycle. the treaty provides for non- interference of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites. telemetry is not needed to verify the provisions, the terms call for exchange of up to five launches per year i each side. i am confident that the new start treaty will in no way compromised america's nuclear deterrent. it requires an adequate stockpile. this calls for a reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons complex, our infrastructure and a science technology and engineering base. i have been up here for the last 4 springs tried to get money for this and this is the first time i think i have a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal. it the department of defense is transferring $4.6 billion to the department of energy's national nuclear security administration.
this transfer will assist in funding critical nuclear weapon like extension programs. the initial applications of this funding are reflected in the president's 2011 budget request, which i urge the congress to approve. these investments in the nuclear posture review strategy for warhead by extension i represent a credible modernization plan to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation's deterrent. let me close with a final personal observation. i first began working on strategic arms control with the russians in 1970, 40 years ago. the u.s. efforts that led to the first strategic arms limitation agreement with moscow two years later. the key question then has always been the same. is the united states better off with a strategic arms agreement with the russians or without it?
the answer for success -- four successive presidents of both parties has always been with an agreement. the u.s. senate has always agreed. the same answer holds true for a new start. the u.s. is better with this treaty and then without it. i am confident that it is the right agreement for today. increases stability and predictability and allows us to sustain its strong nuclear triad and preserves our flexibility. in light of all these factors, i urge the senate to give its consent to the ratification of the new treaty. >> thank you very much. >> thank you for the opportunity to testify. if ratified, the tree will --
the treaty will commit the united states and russia of lower levels. this will increase stability between our countries while demonstrating our joint commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. secretary clinton, secretary gates are testifying to the diplomatic and security advantages of this treaty. i want to focus on how will allow us to continue to modernize our nuclear security and enterprise and to maintain scientific capabilities. the successes of our nuclear program depend on the incredible tech the billet -- technical abilities of the laboratories. our capabilities enable us to assess the stockpile annually, to assess other countries' nuclear abilities. as the stockpile decreases in
size, the role of science and technology will increase in importance. the new start treaty will enhance, not harm, our ability to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of our new stockpile. this conclusion is based on -- the tree supports our modernization agenda -- it is easy to extend the life of the key nuclear weapons systems. these modernization efforts provide a strong foundation and put limits on deployed nuclear weapons under the new start treaty nothing in the treaty will constrain these efforts.
none of our operations will be subject to limitations. the u.s. will remain free to determine the size of the stockpile. the weapons will continue to be retired and dismantled, consistent with the defense department requirements and presidential direction. but remained on track to meet our program's requirements. nothing in this treaty imposes any restrictions on this work. the treaty provides the right of both parties to -- the new start treaty contains no limitations on our program options or work to assess any future warhead issue. as was made clear in the
nuclear or view, this administration is committed to studying all options available for future life extension programs, including we use, refurbishment, and replacement on a case by case basis. we will also participate in the nuclear weapons council on the study of the options. the new start treaty does not place any limits on any of these programs. i believe it enhances u.s. national security without jeopardize the the nuclear deterrence that helps underwrite it.
as you consider this treaty, even be certain that the nation's nuclear stockpile will remain safe, secure, and effective. to modernize our enterprise, we are investing in science, technology, and engineering. the president's fiscal 2011 budget requests will increase science funding by more than 10%. we are investing in the infrastructure we need. the highest infrastructure parties are the construction of major new nuclear facilities for plutonium and uranium. and we're investing in human capital and creating an environment that can attract highly trained and motivated personnel. these personnel, over one-third 50 of them for over 40 days and 40 nights, have been returning their attention to the gulf spill, and it has been remarkable to see that more. we have begun as were already, but it will take sustained leadership from this congress to see it through. the fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects a 30% increase over fiscal year 2010 and includes more than $7 billion for weapons activities and infrastructure.
over the course of the next decade, our plans call for investment of $80 billion. with the support of congress, will transform from a cold war based infrastructure to make moderate capabilities-based nuclear security enterprise. this will provide the confidence and tools that allow the u.s. to consider further nuclear-weapons reductions as we work toward a world without nuclear weapons. thank you. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, secretary chu. admiral mullens. >> i am pleased to add my voice and -- in support of the ratification of the new start treaty and to do so as soon as possible. we are in our seventh month without a treaty with russia. this treaty has the full support of your uniformed military. throughout its negotiations, secretaries clinton and engaged in sure that professional military perspectives were thoroughly considered. during the development, as
personal involved include two face-to-face negotiating sessions and several conversations with my counterpart, the chief of the russian general staff, regarding key aspects of the treaty. the joint chiefs and i also have time to review the analytic work done in the nuclear posture review regarding the shape of future u.s. strategic nuclear forces. its recommendations were transmitted as guidance to the negotiating team in geneva regarding the three central limits on strategic systems. in the warheads and associated with them that are contained in the treaty. in short, the conclusion and implementation of the new start treaty is the right thing for us to do, and we took the time to do it right. the chiefs and i believe the new start treaty issue is an important and necessary balance between three critical aims. it allows us to retain a strong and flexible american nuclear deterrent. it helps strengthen openness and transparency in our relationship with russia.
it also demonstrates our national commitment to reducing -pthe worldwide risk of a nucler incident resulting from the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons. i firmly believe that the central limits established in this treaty and the provision that allows each side the freedom to determine its own force mixed provides us with the necessary flexibility to feel the right future force to meet the nation's needs. we plan to retain our triad of bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. in sufficient diversity in numbers to ensure strategic stability between ourselves and the russian federation. we will also maintain sufficient capability to deter other nuclear states. in addition, the agreement provides for an array of a born verification measures that are critical to both sides in monitoring compliance with the new treaty, and those have been spoken to in earlier statements. this treaty is also a critical element in the president's agenda for reducing nuclear risk
to the u.s. it also our allies and partners and the wider international community. it recently included npr acknowledges the continuing role of nuclear weapons in the defense of america, while placing additional emphasis on positive steps to prevent nuclear terrorism and the risks from nuclear proliferation. in summary, this new start agreement is important and should also be viewed in a wider context. it makes meaningful reductions in the u.s. and russian strategic nuclear arsenals while strengthening strategic stability and the united states national security. coupled with the administration's clear commitment to prudently invest in our aging nuclear infrastructure and in the warhead life extension programs, this treaty is a very meaningful step forward. i encourage the senate to fully steady the treaty. i believe you will see the wisdom of ratifying it.
and i said before you today recommending that you do so. thank you. >> thank you very much, admiral mullen. because of the large number of senators that are here this morning and because secretary gates must leave a few minutes after 11:30 a.m., we're going to have a first round that will be limited to five minutes. and then if there is additional questions and there is time after that first round, we will try to have the second round which might be a few minutes each. secretary clayton, let me start with you. during the course of the negotiations on the new start, were there any side agreements, any informal agreements, any secret agreements with russia that are not included in the treaty relative to any limitations on u.s. missile defenses or any other subject? >> no.
>> admiral, let me ask secretary gates. article 5, paragraph 3 of the treaty would prohibit the feature conversion of icbm silos or slbm want is to be used for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. you testified, i believe, that we have no plans to do such conversions, and it would not make any sense to do so because the cost is greater than a new silo for purpose of missile defense. but there's also a larger issue of the potential misunderstanding or miscalculation. it seems to me that if either side could use silos of one type for the other purpose. would you agree, secretary, that could be potentially destabilizing and dangerous if either side or to launch missile defense interceptors from icbm silos or from a ballistic missile submarines?
and because such launches could appear to the other side to be launches of icbm's or slbm's. >> first, i would like to reinforce secretary clayton -- clinton's testimony to the fact that not only did we not have any plans currently to do -- transform, convert icbm silos into missile defense silos, as you said, because it does not make any sense from a financial standpoint. it is a lot chipper -- cheaper to build missile defense silos on iran, as we are doing. yes, i think it would be destabilizing if you did not know what was coming out of a missile silo.
this is one of the challenges, frankly, that we face as we go forward with conventional strike. any of these things that are confusing to a party on the other side i think needs to be dealt with very carefully. >> and you made a brief reference to that comment to what we are planning to build in alaska, and i believe that references to the plans to build eight spare silos of there, and does that not make it clear, even more clear than i think it already is, that there is no constraint on our ability to build those missile defense silos or even more if needed? >> yes, we're not only building out the second site in -- at the fort, but there will be eight spares those ones that work is complete. >> let me ask you a question about the verification issues, admiral.
you do not yet have a national intelligence estimate on verification. but is it your judgment that this treaty is verifiable? was the intelligence community involved during the negotiations? >> yes, sir, the intelligence community was involved throughout. obviously internally in our discussions as well as with our negotiations with the russians. it is my judgment that this treaty provides the necessary means to adequately verify, consistent with the previous treaty, that even though some of the verification means are different -- secretary gates pointed out the numbers of infractions, something that is specifically different, is the agreement in that treaty to put unique identifiers on every single weapon. clearly, continue to support the national technical means in an ability to verify and speaking specifically of telemetry, while not required, it also included
the exchange of telemetry on five missile tests or launches every single year. in totality, i am very comfortable with the verification regime that exists in the treaty right now. >> and as a matter of fact, is there not a concern from the intelligence perspective as to the status quo that there are no verification provisions that currently exist and there are no inspections that currently exist? >> the meet -- >> without this treaty? >> absolutely. we are in our seventh month in now with no treaty with the russians. and as secretary gates said, we're much better -- it is my view we're much better off with
it than without it. >> including from the verification perspective? >> yes, sir. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. i think the witnesses. secretary clinton, i understand we have yet to receive requested data on russian complaints and verification since 2005. when do we expect that data to be available to the senate? >> senator mccain, that will be available shortly. we're moving as quickly as possible. i know how important it is for your consideration, and we will get it to you very shortly. >> thank you. both you and secretary gates have talked about article 5 that would never be considered, that it would be not something that we would ever plan on. why is it in the treaty then? >> well, it is in the treaty in effect, i would argue, because there has been longstanding
discussions paterson between -- discussions between the russians and the u.s., specifically there were questions asked about whether or not these silos that cover the countryside in the many of our states that are no longer operative were going to be converted, and we said no. we had no intention of continuing with the conversion, and this would now be no longer a subject of continuing contention or discussion. it seemed to us to be a smart negotiating decision to put something in that frankly we never intended to pursue. and there were a number of issues that were very, very difficult to resolve in this treaty. the kind of verification. the numbers of visits.
and telemetry. so in the course of the negotiation, to say that we're not going to do something we're not going to do seemed to be an appropriate position for us to take. >> well, if we are going to state in a treaty everything we were not going to do, it could be a very heavy document. here's my fundamental dilemma that i think many of us face. at the time of the signing of the treaty, the statement was made by the russians that the treaty -- this treaty between russian federation and the u.s., signed on april 8, 2010 may be effective and viable only in condition where there is no qualitative or quantitative build up in missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america. that is a strong statement at the time of the signing of the treaty.
then dmitry medvedev, president medvedev, made the statement on april 12 in an interview, said two countries negotiated a formula in the preamble of the new start treaty that states there is an "interconnection between the strategic offensive arms and missile defense." so these circumstances will change, then we will consider. it is the reason to jeopardize the whole agreement. that is what mr. medvedev said. the foreign minister said on march 30 in a press conference in canada that their obligations regarding missile defense in the treaty text and the accompanying entertainment text would constitute "a legally binding package, etc."
i will have to get some kind of statement from the russians as to exactly what this treaty means in their view. because if the statement, the signing statement at the time that states there is a connection between this treaty and missile defense systems that clearly states that there is only in condition that there is no qualitative or quantitative build up in the missile defense capabilities of the united states of america, that is a pretty clear statement. president medvedev has made the same statement. the need for a minister made the same statement. some russian leadership have all made this statement that this treaty is contingent upon the united states not changing or qualitative or quantitative build up in the missile defense systems. that is bound to be worrisome
to anyone, particularly in light of the decision that was made concerning the polish and czech missile defense systems cancellation or replacement with another system that was done earlier in this administration. so it is clear from the many statements that russian leadership has made that there is a very different interpretation of this treaty from what has been stated here concerning the connection to missile defense systems and that of the russians. so i would be more than happy to hear your response. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for giving us the opportunity to respond. let me start by saying that historical the there have been these kinds of unilateral statements made by the russians. in fact, in connection with the signing of the original start
treaty, the russians made similar statements that it would consider u.s. withdrawal from the abm treaty as sufficient grounds for its withdrawal from start. the u.s. withdrew from that treaty in 2001. the russian federation, as a successor to the soviet union, did not withdraw. secondly, these unilateral statements have no binding effect, no legal effect. the agreement that president obama and medvedev signed is the treaty. and as with many other arms control treaties, it provides that either party, including obviously us, may withdraw from the treaty if that party decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its security interests. the russian unilateral
statement merely reflects its current view that they disagree, as we have heard for years, with our commitment to building up on missile defense system capabilities. and it is not in any way affecting us by undermining that commitment. we remain committed, as you heard, in word and most particularly in financial ways. finally, what we read from medvedev in an april statement. i am not sure it is the one you read from. when asked about the unilateral statement, he said "that does not mean that because of this, if the american side starts to build up of the missile defense statement, that the treaty would automatically lose its power." he went on to say, "i would like
to make sure that there is no impression that any change in the u.s. missile defense system would be reason to abandon a signed agreement." so i view the unilateral statement, and we have one of our own which is now on the record, as really a kind of press release, if you will. here is our position, but we just signed a treaty. even the president of the russian federation says it is truly the agreement that we're going to be following. i understand the question, but i think that both historicly and even in the words of president medvedev, this is not an issue that in any way constrains our limits our commitment to missile defense. >> i would like to very quick comment. first, to reinforce this. the russians can say what they want. it is not in the treaty, it is not binding on the u.s. what is interesting is even in their own unilateral statement,
they hedged. because of the end of the statement they say about the buildup in the missile defense capabilities, such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the russian federation. since i said in my initial opening statement that we have no intention of creating such a capability that would threaten the strategic deterrent capability of the russian rocket forces, even they basically gave themselves and out. >> of course, that is in the eye of the beholder. we obviously have a situation here where an official statement of the russian government states unequivocally and follow-up statements by members of the russian government that this treaty would be directly affected by "only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build up in the missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america."
is best an ambiguous situation. thank you. >> thank you. senator lieberman. >> thank you for being here. then me begin with this statement. my feeling is that if the new start treaty is ratified, it will be a small step forward for mankind. but a long way, i am sure >> a long way from the dream of a nuclear free world. the sad fact that the current state of international relations and human history suggests we are not on the verge of seen a transformation of human behavior to the best to a point where we will have a nuclear free world. as we take this small step forward in reducing the number
of warheads, it makes the status of our nuclear stockpile smaller as a result of this treaty. i wanted to state the observation that there would be a lot of issues raise about this treaty. i think whether or not the new start treaty is ratified will depend on members of the senate of both parties have indeed confidence that the administration -- having the confidence that the administration is committed to modernizing our current nuclear stockpile. as you suggested, secretary gates, the ratification of this arms control treaty may
actually enable you and the administration, and the last administration, to receive the funding from congress that you have been asking for to modernize our current stockpile. let me begin with a baseline question. >> i assume you will be asking for this money because you feel our current nuclear stockpile is aging in various ways -- is aging. and is in various ways, in need of modernization. secretary gates? >> i will ask dr. chu to chime in. the short answer is yes. we are the only nuclear power in the world that is not taking out these kinds of modernization programs. we have never claimed to want any new capabilities. simply to be able to make our weapons more safer, more
reliable, more secure. the a/singer-pirie study out in detail a lot of the worries we have. not a ballots our stockpile today, but where we might be -- not about our stockpile today, but where we might be in 10 years. having to do with the components age. we have needed this for quite some time. congress voted down be reliable replacement warhead program. there has been no progress to providing any funding for nuclear weapons modernization programs since that time. i think you put your finger on it. frankly, just basically realistically, i see this treaty as a vehicle to finally be able to get what we need in the bay of modernization we have been
unable to get otherwise -- in the way of modernization that we have been unable to get otherwise. dr. chu? >> while we are not seeking a military capability, we seek to make the weapons more secure and more reliable. that means we are replacing old electronics you cannot even buy any more. so they will be much less likely to ignite in a fire. something of that nature could set these weapons off. should any terrorist or anybody get ahold of these things, it would be impossible for them to set it off. modernization includes all of these factors. we are improving the safety, security, and viability of these weapons. no new military capability. >> ok. i appreciate the answer from both the year. as you know, when the nuclear posture review came out, there
was language in net -- in it, to keep the nuclear stockpile secure and affected. the language in the review seemed to make it harder to replace. even parts, it sounded like. i think in section 1251 of the report which he made to congress, he clarified that. and when to ask two questions. one is the obvious one -- which you have said dr. chu, there are some parts that cannot be replaced or refurbished. no one is asking for a replacement warhead now. there is nothing in the language or any administration documents that says to the scientist beeline here -- the " tonight even think about it." -- "do not even think about it." to protect our security, we need to build a replacement
warhead, the need to be free to make that recommendation -- they need to be free to make that recommendation. >> absolutely. scientists are asked to look at all the possibilities with and that many of refurbishment and replacement and new designs. there is something that says, ok, before you go to the detailed engineering design, there is a pause button. certainly, to look to the scientific capabilities, it would be prudent to not hold them back on any of those options. that is the position we are taking. >> thank you. my time is up. >> thank you, senator lieberman. >> secretary clinton, you were very clear in answering the
chairman's first question about whether there was any secret agreement or side deal associated with the negotiation of the new start treaty that would affect missile defense. you were very clear in saying, no, there were not. there is a press report that came out last night that claims that the administration is secretly working with the russians to conclude an agreement that would limit u.s. missile defenses. it goes on to say that the administration last month presented a draft agreement to the russians. is this report accurate? >> no, i am not aware of the report, senator collins. as secretary gates said, we have consistently told the
russians that if they want to work with us on missile defense, we are open to working with them. maybe there is something lost in translation here because we have consistently reached out to them. we would like them to be part of a broad missile defense system that protects against countries like iran, north korea -- both of which the border, by the way -- so it is in their interest. secretary gates mentioned that in his opening remarks. if i can ask him to add on to what i said. >> i have seen just a reference to the newspaper story that you described, and what i added in my opening statement was that whenever talks are going on are simply a bowel -- about trying to elicit their partnership with us in terms of regional missile defense, but there is nothing
that in any way, shape, or form would impose any limits on our plans. >> thank you. secretary clinton, and perhaps secretary gates and dr. chu as well, one of my chief concerns is that tactical nuclear weapons are not addressed by this treaty. the commission noted that russia has 3800 tactical nuclear weapons. that is about 10 times what has been our inventory. my concern is not just about the number. study after study has pointed out that tactical nuclear weapons are particularly vulnerable fourth half and diversion, and the administration -- for the theft, and the version.
and the posture review admitted the fear of nuclear terrorism. if the administration believes the most immediate danger is seen nuclear terrorists, and i would agree with that assessment, why does the new start treaty not address tactical nuclear weapons at all? since they are by far more vulnerable to the theft and the version? >> we share your concern, senator. the new start treaty was always going to replace start. that was the decision made by the bush administration which we decided to pursue in order to deal with strategic offensive nuclear forces. but we share your concern about tactical nuclear weapons, and we have raised with the
russians and our desire to begin to talk with them, now that the new start treaty has been negotiated, about tactical nuclear weapons. we need to do this in conjunction with nato allies, because our principal use of tactical nuclear weapons has historically been in europe, and that is where most of the russian tactical nukes are located, close to their border with europe. i raised this issue with the last nato ministerial. i received a positive response from our nato allies that we will work on our posture toward tactical nukes, because there are some in nato who have wanted to withdraw our own tactical nuclear weapons from europe. it is the position of the obama administration that we will not
do that. we will only pursue reductions in our tactical nuclear weapons in concert with cuts in a rush as tactical nuclear weapons. that was well received by the majority of nato allies. >> i will just add that the personal opinion i think any negotiation on tactical nuclear weapons with the russians is going to be a very difficult one. principally because they have such a disproportionately larger number deployed and we do in europe. -- than we do in europe. far more are deployed. getting the russians to agree to anything that ends up providing an equitable status on both sides, if you will, will be a very steep hill to climb. of just add, and in terms of our
own capabilities, the f-35, including the aircraft we are selling to some of our allies, will be dual-capable. >> if i can add one more point, mr. chairman, i agree with secretary gates that negotiating with the russians on tactical nuclear weapons will be difficult. we will need to ratify the new start treaty to have any chance to have a discussion on tactical nuclear weapons. i would add if you look at what we have done in reaching out to our nato allies, it is to prepare as to have that discussion within the context of our strategic concept review within nato, so that we can work toward a unified nato position when we began having serious discussions with the
russians. i would underscore the importance of ratifying this treaty in order to have any exchange with the russians that could lead to verifiable reductions. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator collins. senator ben nelson. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you to all of you for your service and for being here. i want to follow up on your response about working cooperatively with the russians in missile defense. in april, i hosted the u.s.- russia into a parliamentary group, which is a combination of u.s. senators and the russian federation council. we had meetings in moscow as well as here.
they have been called the discussions of the prospect of missile defense cooperation. it seems to be a very strong thoughts with the federation council that they are interested from the parliamentary side, from the legislative side. they are clearly interested in working cooperative lee with the sun missile defense. i understand it come from their own perspective and we come from ours. at least, not only at the executive level with president medvedyev, but also at the parliamentary level. i thought i would mention that. there are going to be all kinds of rumors going on. characterization's of those discussions are not always as accurate as we would hope that they might be. secretary gates, secretary clinton -- the question was
raised by senator mccain, and it relates to whether there is a meeting of minds on this treaty between the russians and the united states. president made it if and -- medvedyev and president obama, about what is in the contract. it appears there is a meeting of the minds on the contract, but posturing going on outside the contract. perhaps it would be helpful if you could, if not today, after word submit something to show this is nothing new. there is always posturing around the agreements. there have been instances of posturing in the past. we entered into agreements, and as to say, even in spite of some of the comments about whether or not we did certain things or did not do certain things, they would do certain things. those examples might put this to rest, because the question seems to be, is there a meeting of the mines? let me ask bluntly -- is there
a meeting of the minds, in your opinion? >> just two comments. i think there is a meeting of the minds between the two presidents. second point, there is no meeting on missile defense. the russians have hated it. they have hated it since the 1960's. it will always hated. mostly because we will build it, and they will not. on the issue of the house, there is a meeting of the minds. on the peripheral issue, the contract, there is no meeting of the minds. >> secretary clinton, can you be as candid as that? >> of course i can. [laughter] >> of course. >> i think secretary gates said it very well.
we have an agreement. someone can have an enforceable agreement to buy and sell a car or house, and they can go out and make all sorts of statements, but it has nothing to do with their obligations under the agreement. the only point i would add to what secretary gates has said it is historically and in these agreements, the russians have said things like that. in my opening testimony, i talked about the original start treaty, where before it was signed, same sequence. the russians said if the u.s. pulls out of the abm treaty, we are pulling out of start. well, the u.s. pulled up the -- out of the abm in 2001, and the russians did not allow up start. i do not think we would all of us be telling you how comfortable we are about how we believe the meeting of the
minds, and as admiral mullen has said twice and in this hearing -- we have no treaty, we have no verification going on at this moment. is it a perfect treaty? i do not know of such a thing exists. in our considered opinion, it is so much in america's interest to get on with entering into the street. >> contract when no one. >> as an old law professor, i could not resist. thank you come up for participating in these inter- parliamentary activities. i have to confess, i was not as aware of the importance of these counterparts -- of the importance to our counterparts these meetings will. i do not know if we appreciate the significance of the
potential opportunities they offer to us. thank you. >> thank you. >> if i could just briefly go back to the meeting of the minds, as i participated and watched these negotiations, the number of times the two countries' leaders personally engaged each other in the details of this i thought was extraordinary. to the points that have been made in terms of within the bounds of the treaty, the meaning of the minds was evident to me, right through it very difficult negotiations. again, the commitment was extraordinary from my perspective, in terms of their understanding, participation, and the negotiation. >> thank you very much. >> senator nelson. >> secretary clinton, will come back to the committee. secretary gates, nice to have you. admiral, thank you for your service.
secretary chu, welcome to the armed services committee. section 21 of the report explains the u.s. force structure of the treaty could consist of a certain number of bombers. since deployment has a maximum level adding up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is mathematically impossible for the u.s. to make such a deployment and be in compliance with the treaty limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. clearly significant additional decisions will have to be made with respect to the u.s. force structure and the treaty. i would be reluctant to cast the vote in favor without more precise detail about the plans for our nuclear delivery structure. my question is, when dennis committee receive a more precise outline of how the --
when can this committee receive a more precise outline of how we can adhere to the treaty limits of 720 vehicles, and will the administration provide a classified briefing to those of us concerned on the specific plan for these deployed nuclear delivery vehicles? >> certainly, we would be happy to provide a classified briefing in terms of the options we have to consider. from the outset, we do not anticipate any changes in the force structure under this treaty that would affect current basing, either of aircraft or missiles. here in the united states. the reductions in the treaty to not need to be made until the seventh year. -- do not need be made until the seventh year. i will ask admiral mullen to chime in here. my opening statement, as the
fact sheet said, here are the categories and the numbers we are working men. frankly, i see no reason for us to make final decisions within less narrow frame marks -- frame works until we have a better sense of strategic developments with russia and other countries as well, especially since we have all this time under the treaty. i think he -- the key reassurance i can is under all the options we are looking at, the ones that we think are likely to employment, it would not involve closing any of our missile bases or changing the basing of our bombers at this
point. >> sir, i would just add that the uniformed leadership feels very strongly about not making those decisions before they are due. that is really seven years out the strength of the treaty, as -- that is really seven years out. the strength of the treaty, as defined, gives us some flexibility. we are beginning to look at what the next submarine looks like, in that part of the triad. what we wanted was as much flexibility for as long as because have to make that decision, and we saw no need to do that now. i understand the math. i understand exactly where you are. we felt very strongly we wanted to wait as long as we could it
to continue to assure the certainty of each leg of the triad as they doubt any in the street. >> the press has reported the administration will spend $100 billion over the next 10 years in nuclear delivery systems, about $30 billion of which would go toward development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine. according to estimates by u.s. strategic command, the current cost of maintenance is approximately $5.6 billion at year, or $56 billion over the decade. that leaves $14 billion of the $100 billion the administration intends to invest. even last if you factor in inflation. that is not enough to acquire a next generation, and develop a conventional global -- a next generation bomber and develop a conventional global strike capability. why do you believe that $100 billion is a sufficient investment in our delivery systems over the next decade? >> from my perspective,
senator, the current investment is a projection of what we understand right now. we are undertaking in the department a very thorough look of what the future, with respect to long range or the next generation bomber is, recognizing the entire infrastructure -- sorry, all the systems will go to modernization of for the next couple of decades. from what i have seen in said the department over time, when those decisions get made, resources are made available to support them. one of the big challenges and concerns right now is the next generation missile submarine. it contains, quite frankly, replacing it, containing it,
containing its costs, and making sure that we can sustain that part of the leg, as we look at how we're going to move ahead with the next generation bomber, as well as the next generation icbm. i am comfortable that the investment supports moving ahead and we will have to make adjustments overtime based on where the triad goes specifically. >> i would say with the figure you mentioned, there are place holders for each of the modernization programs, because no decision has been made. they are basically to be decided. along the lines admiral mullen has just described. those are decisions we will have to make over the next few years. we will have to modernize the systems. we will have to figure out what we can afford. >> at this point, we do not know if the administration will pursue some of these programs? is that what you're saying? >> i am saying we have not yet
made decisions on how we're going to modernize long-range strike, how we're going to modernize the icbm force. we are in the process. we have money in the budget for a new nuclear reactor for the navy, for the next generation nuclear submarine. we are on track in that particular area of modernization. >> it seems my time has expired, mr. chairman. there may be questions that would like to submit for the record. >> so ordered, and thank you, senator. thank you for your thoughtful comments. chairman levin has taken a much more dangerous step in his support for ratifying this treaty. he has appointed me to serve as chairman of the committee until his return. i recognize myself for five minutes. dr. kissinger testified about this treaty last month, and he said it was an evolution of trees that have been negotiated
with previous administrations of both -- evolution of treaties that have been negotiated with previous administrations of both parties. he said a rejection would indicate a new policy had started that might rely largely on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear weapons and would create uncertainty in the calculations of adversaries and allies. would any of you like to comment on his statement? i recognize the secretary of state. >> senator, we agree with that assessment. our department has been briefing, along with our colleagues from the defense, from the joint chiefs, and from energy, a series of former
diplomats and defense officials and energy officials, increasing -- including dr. kissinger. i think the over running sentiment is this treaty is in our national security interests, and a failure to ratify it this treaty would have foreseen and unforeseen consequences. one of the foreseen consequences is a return to a period of instability and unpredictability between the united states and russia, which would not be in our security interests because given what we view as the major threats we face today -- nuclear war with russia is not one of them. thank goodness. you know, that is an evolution, as dr. kissinger has said, of political and strategic and economic changes since the cold war. but human nature being what it is, as senator lieberman said, if you introduce instability. -- if you introduce instability, there is no way we could be responsive. i think you will hear from all of us, we think this treaty
continues the tradition other trees have exemplified -- other treaties have exemplified, making it possible to have an understanding with, legally- binding agreements with the russians that are very much to our interests, as well as theirs. we are working with the russians on a range of matters. i think it would have been very unlikely a year ago we would have seen russia supporting our sanctions in the united nations against iran. we have been building consonance with russia along our range of important issues, and this negotiation over the new start treaty, especially as admiral mullen said, bringing in both of our presidents at a very high level probably a dozen times to hammer out a particular sign the treaty, has really been to our national security interest. the thing that is very much in support of what dr. kissinger
testified to. >> secretary clinton talked about the contribution the treaty provides an in terms of transparency, predictability, and stability. one of the strategic developments we see going on that has not been mentioned in this hearing is that the russians are, over time, reducing their reliance and the size of their conventional forces. for a variety of economic, demographic, and other reasons. as they reduced the size of conventional forces, they are focused on the modernization of strategic forces. in particular, their nuclear capabilities. from our national security standpoint, having this treaty provide the transparency, predictability, and stability in that kind of evolving environment is very much in the
interest of the united states. >> admiral mullen, which you care to comment? are the ramifications for relationships? >> actually, i have worked on this multiple times with my counterpart and our staffs. i guess it would characterize it the same way as i did between the two countries' leaders. very challenging positions. many issues have been raised here. the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. the issue of nuclear defense. the issue of telemetry. in the end, i was a very encouraged, the negotiations were difficult, with the willingness to move to a position to get to the street. from a russian military perspective -- obviously the two countries, but particularly the russian military perspective. i am encouraged.
part of that is also represented an increase relationships across the board. this being a big piece of it iran for myself -- this being a big he said that. for myself and my counterpart, when we get to what we can do in many other areas -- counter- terrorism comes immediately to mind. from where we were to where we are, even over the last couple of years, it has improved dramatically. >> my time has expired. i will recognize senator brown next. let me make two out final comments. it is a powerful picture to have the four of you sitting here, representing a broad set of viewpoints, supporting the treaty. thank you for taking the time to be here.
i think secretary chu and secretary clinton are aware of our hearts policy work with russia. there are ways they point out we can work with russia. ways we can not to read their cultural and historical differences. the point make about expanding our relationship through the -- the point you make about expanding our relationship through the approval of this treaty -- the points you make about expanding our relationship through the approval of this treaty and are important. senator brown, you're recognized. >> thank you. thank you, secretary clinton for everything you are doing. i have a great concern about iran. i find that their nuclear ambitions are more destabilizing. i am wondering, in your negotiations with russia, have you been able to approach that subject with russia? i cannot imagine it would like a nuclear iran to help destabilize the region and
potentially export their brand of terrorism, in many instances, around the world in the region. any comment on that? >> thank you, senator. welcome to this committee. >> thank you. >> i think your concerns are well placed. the four of us and many others in the government spent a great deal of our time thinking about iran, how to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. i believe that our close cooperation with russia on negotiating this new start treaty added significantly to our ability to work with them regarding iran. three quick examples. because we developed very good
working relationships, despite our disagreements, between our military and civilian leadership, i think it gave us a better base on which to raise concerns about iran. is it awhile. -- it took a while to make the case to the russians that iran was pursuing not just a peaceful nuclear capacity, but in our view, poised to pursue nuclear weapons. once they became convinced there was some concern there, they began working with us. in the fall, we reached an agreement with russia and france to try to get iran to demonstrate some good faith by shipping out its low-enriched uranium outside of iran, to be enriched and returned, and the
russians stood with us. they stood with us to all the ups and downs of that negotiation. finally, the russians have consistently made it clear that they share our concerns now about a nuclear-armed iran. it is hard to draw a straight line from the many ways we have been " operating with them, but i think -- from the many ways we have been cooperating with them, but i think it is human relations, senator. we have to develop the highest level of cooperation between our presidents and our counterparts. you will see president medvedyev coming here next week for a summit with president obama. we have a very comprehensive set of issues the in taejon, openly, candidly. not always -- be in taejon, openly, candidly. not always in agreement. we think we have made a strong
basis for our work on major threats. certainly a country like iran getting access to nuclear weapons. but russia is working with us. >> thank you. i would encourage you to continue that relationship, because i find it disturbing with all the issues -- with all the efforts we are trying, iran is still circumventing sanctions. i appreciate your continued leadership. >> senator, you just put your finger on a schizophrenic russian approach to the us >> russian approach to this. >> glad you said that. >> when i was in moscow years ago, then-president putin said he considered iran russia's greatest national security threat. at the same time, i was told
they do not need to have a missile to deliver a nuclear weapon to russia. and yet, they have these commercial interests in iran that go back more than 20 years. in 1992, when i visited moscow as the first head of cia, i raised this with my counterpart about their support for the nuclear reactor in iran. we went back and forth, and finally, they said it was all about the money. it is this balancing act. in russia, they recognize the security threat iran represents, but there are commercial opportunities, which rank the, are not unique to them in europe. >> thank you. i have one final question, and that is among our wrestling with the strategic warheads, while
the russians will deploy at least 3800 tactical nukes their warheads, in addition to strategic nuclear warheads, and as a result russians maintain a 10 to one superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. we're outnumbered by two to one in terms of strategic nuclear weapons. you can deploy some of these weapons on submarines. it seems -- in trying to get a handle on how all that is creating stability? i direct this to the secretary of -- how is this creating nuclear stability in a favorable manner for us and our allies? >> it is a concern, obviously. the strategic arms talks have always focused strictly on the
strategic weapons. icbm's, long-range heavy bombers. i think the europeans are clearly concerned about this. there is a huge disparity in the number of those deployed weapons in europe, as you suggest. i think there is a general feeling on our part and on the part of our european allies that the next step needs to involve this issue. i would echo something secretary clinton said earlier. we will never get to that step with the russians on tactical nukes if this treaty on strategic nuclear weapons is not ratified. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my time is expired. >> thank you, senator brown. just a quick comment on
something that was just raised. i came back in the middle of the answer. on the commercial relationship between russia and iran, i understand it secretary clinton -- i understand -- secretary clinton, perhaps you can confirm this -- russia has finally cancel the sale of the best-300 -- s-300. there are different reports to that. the sale to iran of those anti- air systems. do you know if that is accurate? >> i will check. my recollection is they announced once again a postponement, an indefinite suspension. i think we have to separate out, and we can get more information for both senator brown and the committee, iran is entitled to civil, peaceful,
nuclear energy. >> we understand that. but the russians have consistently been working on the reactor at-year -- bashir and providing support. until the recent u.n. security resolution, he could make the argument they were also entitled to defensive weapons, which the s-300's are claimed to be. the russians over the last 15 months, i would argue in part due to our relationship building, have never delivered those and have consistently postponed it. i will double check. if they canceled the sale, i am not aware of it. i am very much aware and supportive of their continuing suspension. >> is a very significant development. we are very happy they have this bond it.
i think there was a report that they actually would go beyond that, following the un resolution. >> but they said was they would not deliver the system. is that a cancellation or an indefinite suspension? either way it is good news. it will not deliver the system. >> thank you. >> senator hageman -- hagen. >> thank you to all of you for the work you're doing for our country. we appreciate that very much. i want to talk about the retention of nuclear scientists and engineers. this requires a modernized infrastructure and a highly- capable workforce to sustain nuclear deterrence. our labs cannot reduce impact on our nuclear arsenal without being appropriately resources. -- appropriately restores -- resourced.
i am concerned about a perceived lack of them orphans. -- importance. secretary chu, can you describe what has been said about the negative impact budgetary pressures are having on the ability to manage our nuclear arsenal without testing? >> certainly. senator of, this is the very big concern. when i became secretary of energy and looked at the fraction of the nsa budget devoted to science and technology programs, i think it
goes directly to what you speak of, the intellectual capability. that faction was declining. it was a 10-year path to going in half. so, i said we have to stop this. we have to reverse this. within the last year, we have had to rebuild that. there's a population bulge nearing retirement. we need people to carry the stockpile. our obligations are to provide safe, secure, and reliable weapons coming forward. we believe we can do this. in 2011, and the out years, that is the path we are taking. in order to recruit the best and brightest, they have to be convinced the country cares about this. they have to be condensed -- because essentially, they disappear.
they cannot publish in a lot -- a lot of their best work cannot be published in a lot of open literature. if they are convinced he 9 states does beat the care about this, and it is such -- the united states does care about this, and it is such a vital part. also you have the facilities. you have to maintain and modernize the facilities. >> it is also interesting. i was talking to individuals with an energy company. due to the fact we have not been building nuclear powerplant, there is a vacuum of nuclear engineers. this company is helping fund nuclear engineering programs at universities because of the need for nuclear engineers and scientists. >> that does not directly impact the ennis a mission, but certainly -- the nsa mission, but certainly on the energy
side, we have consistently given now a skilled $1 million to students. there has certainly been -- we anticipate there it is now a shortage and the will be an increasing shortage as the world looks to nuclear energy as part of the solution to decrease in carbon emissions. >> some experts indicate that the senate does not ratify the new start treaty, it can send conflicting messages about the administration's commitment to the non-proliferation treaty. some experts add that ratifying will send a positive mention message to other countries in nuclear issues. in other words, if the two countries that possessed the most nuclear-weapons agree on verification and compliance and are committed to non- proliferation, it is possible to achieve consensus with other
countries. it is important to encourage non-nuclear states to sign and abide by the nonproliferation treaty, and ratifying will demonstrate our commitment to nonproliferation, sending a message and isolating iran. in april 2009, during s senate foreign relations committee, it was indicated that if the u.s. were not sealed ratify the treaty, it would have -- or not to ratify the treaty, it would have a detrimental effect on our relations with other countries. if we do not ratify the treaty, what implications will that have on gaining international consensus on the non- proliferation treaty? >> think your question really summarized our concerns -- i think your question really summarized their concerns. we've seen positive response because of our commitment to this treaty, because the
president obama's speech in prague, because of our active involvement in a non proliferating -- and non- proliferation treaty review conference. because we have worked towards further disarmament goals with russia, that has given a boost to non-proliferation efforts globally. speaking personally from minor exchanges with my counterparts in nato and elsewhere, -- from my exchanges with my counterparts in nato and elsewhere, it was a great move of leadership in the nonproliferation agenda. i think we saw that in getting added the npt, which the united states was not able to do in 2005. a very positive response from our nato allies, many of them clearly have doubts about russia. those in eastern and central europe.
and in our conversations coming out of the news -- nuclear posture review, the national security statement that has recently been put out. i think your question is absolutely the case. if we have been able to move this agenda for word, it has been because of our -- forward, it is and because of our work with russia on the street. >> i have nothing to add to that. >> thank you. >> senator chambliss. >> thank you to the panel, for what you do, not only on this particular issue, but your service to our country. we appreciate very much. it is pretty obvious, based on the questions being asked, as senator mccain has said, the
comments from the russians have been so strong and iraq -- i do not know if there's been a challenge to that. certainly president needed if is going to be here -- medvedyev is going to be here next week. there'll be an opportunity to clarify this. i hope the president challenges him on it, because it is a key issue with respect to where we go. with that in mind, secretary clinton, secretary gates, i want to focus on what i see as are relevant decision point with respect to missile defense and what factors the u.s. will consider when making decisions. first of all, some of my colleagues have stated in the overall context of u.s. national security, the issue of missile defense may be more important than any agreement the u.s. and russia enter into regarding
nuclear weapons. that is because we are much less likely, as both secretary clinton and gates have alluded to today, to face a nuclear conflict with the russians that we are to be attacked or threatened by a rogue nation or terrorist group that possesses nuclear weapons. i agree with that perspective. that is why we need a robust missile defense system -- not to protect us from the russians, but primarily to protect us from are rogue nation. secretary gets, and you spoke to this issue directly in previous -- secretary gates, you spoke to this issue directly in previous testimony. the plan to deploy the missile in europe intended to defend against launches in the least, it will have a nice ebm intercepted ability, and could represent from the russian perspective a qualitative
improvement in u.s. missile defense that could provoke a withdrawal from the treaty. assuming the u.s. and european allies still want to deploy the sm-3 block 2b missile around the time frame, would you recommend the united states deploy the system, regardless of the russian response? >> yes, sir, i would. i think the kind of missile threat we face from rogue states such as iran and north korea is such a problem, and i think by 2020, we well may see it from other states. especially, if we are unsuccessful in stopping iran from building nuclear weapons, i think you'll see a proliferation in the middle east
of nuclear-weapons and probably missiles. i think the need will be even greater. i am fast for redeemed 10 years. -- i am fast forwarding 10 years. the path laid out, plus keeping the ground-based interceptors in alaska and continuing to upgrade those for the longer- range missiles, it would be absolutely essential. there is one other point we need to do this. that is because one of the elements of intelligence that contributed to the decision on the phase-adaptive array was the realization that if he iran were to launch a missile attack on europe, it would not be one or two missiles or a handful. it would more likely be a salvo kind of attack, where you would
be dealing with scores or hundreds of missiles. the kinds of capability we are talking about with the sm-3 block 2b would give us the ability to protect our facilities and allies in europe. that would be my recommendation if, god forbid, i were in this job in years from now. [laughter] >> mr. secretary, you did not think he would be there now, so who knows. secretary clinton, do you concur with that? >> yes, i do, completely. the whole thing, mr. chairman. >> that makes it much more comforting. i assumed that was the case, mr. secretary. my time is up, so i do not have time to get into the issue of rail-mobile launched weapons, which this treaty is silent on. we know the russians have a history of that.
as i read the treaty, those would be exempt. that could be a serious issue for a number of us. i will submit a question for the record relative to rail as well as sea and air-launched icbm's. one final point. with regard to the flux -- to this issue, and the administration lacks commitment as expressed today, i do not know if you have given any thought to this, but i would hope he would maybe give some thought to -- you would maybe give some thought to having a red team take a look at this so we can move as quickly as you folks want estimate. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator chambliss. senator burris.
>> i would like to thank you for your service to our country. will we still be able to respond to a provocation if our nuclear arsenal is reduced to the level indicated in the treaty? >> the analysis done prior to and in support of the negotiations with respect to that from a military capability standpoint was extensive. the uniformed leadership was aware of that and it certainly took that into consideration as we arrived at our positions. and our comfort level with the provisions in the treaty. >> secretary chu, you just heard secretary -- senator hagan is the question of training of our nuclear engineers. does the department need to be
assisted in their training process? so they have the brain power to deal with this new technology? >> anti-american research university has trained the type -- i think the american research universities train the type of people we seek. it is really a matter of recruiting the best of those people -- . .
russian defense minister said russia would not fulfil its pledge without -- would fulfil its pledge without eliminating a single weapon. >> it looks like three of us will already. the number of warheads for the russians is above the treaty limits. >> we can give you additional information to respond to. you will find that there are, unfortunately, a number of commentators or analysts who do
not believe in arms control treaties at all. from my perspective, they are slanting a lot of what they say. this is a perfect example of that. as secretary gates pointed out, there would be reductions on the russian side. >> it is interesting that they can have this conflicting analysis of what is really there. secretary gates, secretary clinton, i'd like to raise a question on iran. as you know, iran and north korea have technology for nuclear weapons. will the treaty change if they manage to develop these nuclear weapons?
>> no. we think the north koreans already have them. as we have talked earlier about in the hearing, we are clearly prevented from committed to iran getting them. this would have no impact on the treaty. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my time is expired. >> when a boy to have a couple minutes for a second round. secretary gates cannot stay. do you want to stay on for a couple of minutes? forretary, is there any need a new nuclear weapon at this time? >> to the best of my knowledge, no. >> admiral? >> same answer. >> i want to go back to this
language in these statements. i went back and look at the statements for s.t.a.r.t.. they are incredibly similar. the opening words are exactly the same. they said this treaty may be effective and viable only under the conditions of compliance with the abm treaty. they say the extraordinary events refer to the refer -- to the supreme national interests. we issued a statement in response. their statement is the same
format and the same number of words. this s.t.a.r.t. i was negotiated by president bush. you have all indicated that either side has a right, under that treaty, to withdraw supreme national interests indicate it. so if the russians, for whatever reason, decide that their supreme national interests require them to withdraw, they can withdraw. we can withdraw if our supreme national interests so indicated to us. is that correct, secretary clinton, secretary gates? >> yes. >> can we take your nodding of the heads? i would hope we can treat these
unilateral statement the same as was the case with the first president bush. they are so close, that they are almost perfect. nothing is perfect, but that is as close as you can come. finally, on the statement of russia cooperating with iran -- the cooperation you are talking about which the russians is the possible addition of information to their radar missile defense system. they are joining up to make more capable what we are going to proceed with in the area of missile defense. is that correct? >> yes. >> it is not a limitation on us, it is a addition to the capability of our anti-missile system, an expansion of capability.
that would make a very powerful statement to iran, despite the recent -- just like a recent sanctions are a powerful statement. they are very isolated. people have been outspoken there is a threat to the -- from the russians and the chinese. if they can expand their missile defense system which was a defense against an iranian threat, would you agree that that would be an extraordinarily carpel statement to iran about their tightening isolation? >> yes. >> do you agree with that information? >> yes i do. mr. chairman, just to follow up on your question. i want to make sure the record is clear on one additional point. senator collins raised a
certain press reports about a u.s.-russia deal about missile defense. i want to be clear. number one, there is no secret deal. number two, there is no deal to limit missile defenses, either in this treaty or in any other way. number 3, on that score the story is dead wrong. i want to be very clear about that. i do not want anyone using what is another inaccurate story to argue against this treaty. secretary gates and i have both said that we will continue to explore missile defense cooperation with russia. the talks are not secret and there is nothing on the table or in the wildest contemplation that will involve any limits on our missile defense. we are seeking have them expanded with additional capabilities. >> which would be a part of a
weapon against the great threats that is out there, which is iran. >> i want to continue listening and learning. i know the secretary is under time restraints. i know we are going to have for me, it is also a trust and verification issue. in the back of my mind, i am saying, we are going to do all of these wonderful things. but how can we assure that we are not being misled? i want to make sure i know where my head is at. mr. chairman, thank you for your leadership in holding these hearings. >> thank you, senator brown. senator met haskell has a question, not for you -- senator macassar sculpture -- senator mccaskill has a question, but
not for you. senator, your timing is always perfect. >> thank you. thank you all for being here. i appreciate it. i have been following the hearings even though i have not been here physically. i know that the secretary said retained.have been we are proud to house those weapons in missouri. what can we expect in terms of expect -- in terms of inspection and verification? how can i reassure all the great folks in missouri that the technology and the secrets that we have wicca b-2 fleet will not be in any way compromised?
>> the capability that you describe is absolutely critical. one of the areas we look very carefully at was the preservation of the three legs. what does that mean in the future structure? we do not need to make any decisions with respect to that until seven years into the treaty. in terms of preserving the capability that we have, the technical capability that we have, there is nothing, from my perspective in terms of verification that would threaten that understanding. the treaty has a provision for 18 inspections per year, 10 of
which are what i would called operational inspections. eight of those would be administrative kinds of inspections in support of the verification regime. there are more in terms of verifying the number of warheads that is there for each system. that is an important strength of this verification system on both sides. in terms of protecting our capability and the investment that we have made in technology systems and people, this treaty will more than do that. we do have a great group of people at whitman, as we do throughout the military. we do not need to worry about that at all.
>> secretary clinton, let me reiterate for the record how proud you make our country. , with the job you do around the world. i think you reflect well on our nation and you are doing a masterful work under difficult circumstances. we have so many places to worry about right now. i would want to secure from you what you see as the consequences of not ratifying the treaty, particularly as it relates to the terms of the rogue extremists or loud the world. what happens if we cannot get this done? >> you have put into words what our greatest fear is. we believe that the consequennes of not ratifying this treaty
would have very serious impacts on our relationship with russia , and would give comfort to the adversaries we face are around theeworld. it would not only disadvantage us because we would not have the transparency, the verification regime to know what is going on in russia, but it would undermine the relationship that the president has been leading us to establish between the u.s. and russia so that together we can tackle the threat posed by iran, north korea, and networks of terrorists. secondly, it would, unfortunately, turned back our effort to try to unify the
international community against those threats. we have made progress with russia and russia has influence with a number of other countries to begin to recognize that the cold war is over. the stand off between the united states and the former soviet union is a thing of the past. thankfully, we can look for other ways to build confidence and trust between us, which is imperative given the very real threats of nuclear threatsrogue rogue statesmed and networks of terrorists. we got many countries to come together to acknowledge the fact that we are all under threat.
russia is a critical part of us doing that. >> the russian military -- what is the state of their ability to implement? do we have the kind of confidence we have in their ability to implement within the russian military? >> overall, yes ma'am. i have watched, from my perspective since 2000 and for and dealing with them from an operational force perspective, they have made a significant decision and a shift to invest in their strategic forces. i have watched them modernize and put the money in and conduct
the training. they have certainly been a challenge, economically and physically in their own defense budget. but this is an area that they continue to focus on and invest in. i have been informed by the head of their navy when i was in europe in the line ab job and -- in my navy job and in my current job. they are committed to getting this done. >> if i could just add something to what admiral mullen said. this is a key point. this treaty may seem modest and the sculpture -- modest in scop e, but they are moving away from a land-based army and focus
scarcer resources on their strategic capacity. i think this treaty actually is more significant because as the russian military makes these changes, our relationship with them and this agreement on strategic nuclear offensive weapons gives us more insight into what their future plans are. so it is a look forward as opposed to a static look or a look backward. >> i think this treaty represents another activity where we have to talk about the negative. what happens if we don't get about what happens if we don't do it? i am convinced that this treaty is preferable to the alternative. i appreciate all of you being here today. thank you for all your good
work. maybe more so than the others on the panel, you are wearing a lot of different hats. it may be a relief to not sit around talking about oil. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you senator. senator brown had a question. >> hopefully, i will be able to cement some questions for the record later -- submit some questions for the record later. >> certainly. we want to thank the witnesses for their extraordinary service. i am not going to go through that service because we all want to get to lunch. secretary clinton, if you could delay a moment before you leave, i have something i would like to
patrick leahy on supreme court nominee elena kagan. >> c-span, our public affairs content is available on television, radio, and online. you can also connect with us on twitter, facebook and youtube. >> general david patraeus. now look at the first day of his testimony. he fainted during the testimony due to dehydration.
>> good morning, everybody. today, the committee proceeds testimony on the progress in afghanistan with the commander of u.s. central command. we extend to all of the men and women who serve under your command, the banks of this committee for their service, their valor and their dedication. they deserve our support. i know our committee gives them that full support. >> i would do that, mr. chairman. thank you. >> the milestone was reached for the first time, more troops are serving in afghanistan and in iraq. this marks one year since standing crystal -- stanley
mccrystal took command. there have been mixed results in marjah and assassinations of local officials. there have been failures of afghan officials to deliver services, a delay in the kandahar campaign and upset release of two officials who had strong coalitions of support. there has been a growth of militias and counterproductive activities of some u.s. hired private security contractors. there has been some differences between them and the taliban. general mcccrystal acknowledged
these reports. he also said you have to step back and acknowledge the trend in these directions. my focus is and always has been in getting the afghan national security forces trained and equipped to take over their country's security. it is the key to success in afghanistan. the general said in a press release that the afghan security are a strategic main effort and a key to long-term stability in afghanistan. he repeatedly said the goal of putting afghans in the lead and making them responsible for their future. afghans have said they want to be responsible for their own security and their own affairs. at theeting was held beginning of this month. the adopted a resolution calling
on the international community to expedite the process of equipment, training, and strengthening the afghan training forces so that they can provide security for their own people. but progress toward the goal of afghans taking the lead in the operations has been unsatisfactory. today, operations in afghanistan have been dependent on coalition forces. they anticipate increases in afghan forces in and around ka ndahar to create a rising tide of security. that is not good enough. our partnering goals should be at least a ratio of one-one in kandahar. afghan troops should be in the
lead in most operations. having afghan guinness in the lead is critical in can the hearth. the likelihood of success is based on popular support. that support is important to the counterinsurgency strategy that has been set by general patraeus. the afghan government has twice the support at the united states does. a report said 90% of afghan support the government over the taliban. but only 40% of the afghan people have a favorable view of the united states. they told us we should train and equip the afghan security forces to provide their own security
and then depart. last week, general mccrystal announced time was needed to secure the support of tribal leaders. i trust his judgment on the timing. it is more employment than we -- that we get it right then we get it fast. when you go to protect people, they have to want you to protect them. i would rather have a few more afghan forces in the league then to have another fourth attempt to secure can hire -- kandahar a few months earlier. they need to be placed in the
lead in the counterinsurgency backed by u.s. forces. the nato training mission in afghanistan, under lieutenant general caldwell, now actually exceeds monthly recruitment goals. these forces are above where they need to be to meet the goals for october, 2010 at 109,000 police personnel. the training mission does not have enough training to process all the recruits who are signing up to join in the security forces. the most recent available figures show that more than 50 to 100 traders that we need and
only 50 are on the ground. according to a may 29 report from lieutenant general called well, the training mission is yet to receive 700 pp trainers -- has yet to receive 750 trainers. it is totally unacceptable that this shortfall persists. nato members who do not send additional combat troops, or to attend -- who intend to reduce their troops, should operate theater.m uppethe
42 at cannes groups can -- 42 afghan groups can operate independently. there is some doubt on the accuracy of that assessment. but they do not explain why the u.s. coalition forces, that are --ally leading operations it is our troops who are concentrated in the areas where the fighting is heaviest and where the future of as can -- the future of afghanistan may hang in the balance. perhaps we will hear answers today. why aren't more afghan troops leading security operations? how many afghan combat
battalions are there in kandahar? when will the afghan yunis take a leave their -- units take the lead there? why isn't the ratio at least one-to-one? i know american troops are more equipped and afghan troops. the issue is who can best connect with and protect the population. as the afghan defense minister described, it is a different type operation. it is not like marjah. it is not going to be that connected. can ask can -- can afghanistan
handle the mission properly? the population wants security. it was that security provided by afghans. having afghan troops among the afghan people is more accepted by them. the coalition forces are the background providing support to those afghan troops. success in kandahar will be more likely with afghan troops in the lead. i am going to put the balance of my statement in the record. i will conclude by saying, the afghan record and people need to demonstrate a sense of urgency and commitment to succeed in building a lasting peace in afghanistan. the afghan government and people demonstrate a willingness to fight and assume increasing responsibility for their security affairs. the american people will be steadfast partners in that endeavor. senator mccain?
>> i think the witnesses for joining us this morning to discuss the events in afghanistan. let me thank you for your leadership of our men and women in uniform, especially those in harm's way. as is well known, i believe winning the war in afghanistan is of vital national security entrance. the best way to achieve success is by partially restores counterinsurgency strategy that by strong u.s.-afghan military partnerships. i support the president's decision to increase our commitment in afghanistan. i will be brief and come to the point. as i gauge the progress of any war effort, i look at the broader trend line. this is why i am deeply
concerned about our fight in afghanistan. 10,000 additional nato troops are supposed to deploy along with our forces. we presently have just over half of that number. it is not clear when or from with the rest of them will arrive. at the same time, the dutch government plans for an imminent withdrawal of their forces. yesterday, the government of poland, on nato to draw a timetable to end the alliance's mission in afghanistan and withdraw our forces. in marjah, our troops are perform exceptionally. but we have not been able to provide durable, consistent security to the population. the government seems to be
lagging. general mccrystal recently referred to the city as a bleeding ulcer. i feel that marjah is sending a very troubling signal. . kandahar is a success, the success of the war can be determined. the delay in our operation is not projecting an air of confidence and success. to get kandahar right, we need an integrated strategy. the political part of that strategy is not there. i hear a lot about the number of civilians being deployed in kandahar.
i have not heard how we will begin to change the complex play of power in the city and the contacting practice that we are dependent on. meanwhile, it is very troubling that the president of afghanistan has decided to remove his minister of the interior and intelligence, two of our most important partners in this government. they are outstanding and effected. i do not know why the president made this decision. the explanation given by his former intelligence chief, which we read in the newspaper this weekend, seemed to have a ring of truth to it. if the president of afghanistan no longer believes the u.s. will succeed and is shifting his result to a policy of accommodation and the pakistani
military. true, this could be very dangerous. that is the larger trend that underlies all of the others, a numbing loss of confidence in america. it seems to be shared by our friends in afghanistan as well as its neighbors. as our witnesses know, especially general patreaus, a war is a fight for the covenants of the people. we are going to win. no matter how much that has been explained, the decision to begin withdrawing our forces from afghanistan arbitrarily in july of 2011, seems to be having exactly the effect that many of us predicted it would. it is convicting -- convincing the key actors that the united states is more interested in
leaving that succeeding in this conflict. they are all making the necessary accommodations for a post-american afghanistan. this is not to say that we cannot succeed. i think we can and we must. but it is to say that, with ongoing difficulties, growing concerns about the afghan government, troop commitment still lagging from nato, and the final minutes of our own search not set to reach afghanistan until the first of september, it seems increasingly clear that hoping for success on the arbitrary time line set by the administration is simply unrealistic. again, i would achill general mccrystal -- echo general mccry
stal, it is better that we get it right then we get it fast. we need to have a realistic debate about what it will take and how long it will take to achieve our goals. i look for to having that discussion with our witnesses. >> thank you, senator mccain. >> distinguished members of the committee. thank you for inviting us to testify here today. i would like to give you an update on recent progress and the remaining challenges in afghanistan. as you know, president obama announced our strategy in december, including deployment of an additional 30,000 troops. they will be in place by the end of the summer. our troops will be joined by a partner troops and more will
come in the coming months. currently, the main operational effort for isap and our afghan partners continue to be in the river valley in kandahar. our focus is on protecting the population and foster and security. so far, we believe we have been making gradual, but important progress. the coalition is protesting the insurgency more effectively, in more places, and with more forces. the resurgence see -- the insurgency is resilient and resourceful. the nature of recent insurgent attacks is beginning to indicate a possible reduction in some of their operational capacity. the percentage of complex attacks, those employing more than one means of attack, has
steadily dropped. the average number of casualties per attack is below 2009 levels. afghans in the region have shown increased willingness to report suspected ied's. this suggests growing pockets of confidence and a willingness to support isap in establishing security and governance. when taking a deliberate approach. we are expanding our efforts to improve local governments in the key districts and improve the security situation gradually. some in congress have expressed concern about the impact of local power brokers on our efforts in kandahar. we share this concern. there are ways in which our own contracting practices have had the unintended consequences km.
general patreus are examining our practices. when we have evidence of corruption, we will work with the afghan government to prosecute those who violate the law. let me turn to our efforts to build the capability and capacity. building an effective afghan national security force remains key, both to the long-term stability of afghanistan and to our ability to transition security responsibility and drawdown our forces as conditions allow. we have reduced the instructor to trainee ratio. the afghan national army is on schedule to meet our goal of
134,000 troops for fiscal year 2010. nearly 85% of the a.n.a. is in the field. we have increased the capacity to conduct training. recent salary and benefits initiatives have addressed pay disparities between the a.n.a. and the a.n.p. we believe that rising numbers and using -- and newly instituted policies will
further reduce attrition. needless to say, the purpose of these efforts is to ensure a gradual transition of security responsibility to the afghan government. i want to emphasize that transition does not mean abandonment or withdrawal. we are committed to supporting the people of afghanistan over the long term. we will not walk away from this commitment. we will not remain in the lead combat role indefinitely. as the international military presence began to shift from a combat role to an advisor role, it will be like to focus on capacity building, governess, and development. we are working closely with the afghan government to plan for the transition process. in may, the afghan president and 14 members of the cabinet were
here for about a week for a strategic dialogue. at the travel conference in july, the afghan government will present further plans for achieving progress in governance across for ministerial clusters. we also expect to hear more from the afghan government to address corruption and reintegration. let me say a few words about reconciliation and reintegration. it has generated a great deal of interest. all parties to the conflict in afghanistan recognize that, in the and some resolution will be required to bring this conflict to a close. the afghan government is developing plans to reconcile leaders and reintegrate low- level fighters. in april, the president of afghanistan presented his plan for reintegration. he was given a conditional
mandate to move lower in this area. the u.s. supports an afghan-lead process that seeks to bring back into society those who break ties with al qaeda and live on the afghan constitution and all of its requirements. that me conclude that we are headed in the right direction in afghanistan. of the 121 he districts identified by isap in december of last year, 60 were assessed to be sympathetic or neutral to the afghan government. that number has climbed to 73%. . the uncertainty is beginning to lose momentum. the outcome is far from determine. these are still early days for the administration's new strategy. it is only a matter of months
since the president's announcement. when i greet this committee in february, i said we would face setbacks, even as we achieve progress. none of what we are doing in afghanistan -- long-term progress will involve patients. we are confident that general mccrystal will be able to show more progress by the end of the year. we are grateful to this committee for continuing to support our efforts. particularly, we appreciate your support for full funding for the afghan security forces, for coalition support bonds, and for the commanders support authority. thank you again for inviting us here today for this discussion and for your support of the men
and women who serve in uniform and your support to enable progress in afghanistan. thank you and i looked over to your questions. >> general? >> thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the progress in the afghanistan and the counterinsurgency campaign that is being conducted there. it is a pleasure to do this with undersecretary. soon after the 9/11 attacks, the coalition led by the u.s. contracted -- conducted a campaign against extremists in
afghanistan. members of the coalition rebuilt the instructors -- extremis have engaged in a campaign against the afghan people and the government. they pose a threat not just to afghanistan and the region, but to countries throughout the world. in response to the threats posed by these extremists, our partners are engaged in a campaign to prevent centuries in afghanistan like the ones al qaeda enjoyed their window taliban ruled there prior to 9/11. we are working with our partners to wrest the initiative from the
taliban and support the establishment of afghan government that is seen as legitimate to the afghan people. we have worked hard to get the input right in afghanistan. we have worked to build the organization needed to carry out a comprehensive civil military campaign. we have put the best military leaders in charge of those organizations. we have refined and develop the plans and concepts needed to guide the conduct of a comprehensive effort. we have deployed substantial additional resources, resources that our military and are needed to develop a plan. the deployment of 30,000
additional forces announced by president obama in december and their equipment is slightly ahead of schedule. nearly 21,000 of the additional 30,000 are now in afghanistan. by the end of august, all of the additional forces will be on the ground, except for the headquarters, which is not required for one month later. we are trying to increase the size of the afghan national army and police. that is on track. it is considerable work to be gone in that critical area. even as we continue the effort is to complete in the ingress right, the actions taken over the last 18 months, which include tripling the u.s. for its contribution and increasing the u.s.-civilian component, have enabled the initiation of new efforts in key areas in
afghanistan. the initial main effort has been in the central river valley. u.s. and u.k. forces have made progress there. predictably, the enemy has fought back as we have taken away an important sanctuary in marjah and elsewhere. the focus is now shifting to the kandahar province. in the months ahead, we will see an additional u.s. brigade deployed in the districts a round kandahar. we will see the introduction of u.s. military police and afghan police, along with other forces and civilians who will work with the impressive canadian reconstruction team that has been operating in the city. the concept is to provide a
rising tide of security that will expand over time and establish the foundation of improved security on which local afghan governments can be built and will offer the improvement of basic services in other areas. there will be nothing easy about any of this. i have noticed that the going is likely to get harder before it gets easier. that has already been the case as we have seen recently. it is essential that we make progress in the critical southern part of the country where the 9/11 attacks were planned by al qaeda during the period where the taliban controlled it and much of the country. we are setting the conditions necessary to transition the security from the international coalition to the afghan government. we are increasing the size and capability of the a.n.s.f.
afghan security forces are on track to meet their targets. in 2009, the number was 150,000. today, there are over 131,000. to help achieve greater equality, general mccrystal has stressed greater partnerships. considerable progress has been made in getting the concept made for development of the a.n.s.f. improving it has been facilitated by the establishment of the nato training mission in afghanistan, the zero monetization created by helping -- to help afghanistan expand in the first six months, leadership
has made progress in reversing adverse trends in growth and profession as asian -- prof essionalization of the a.n.s.f. in all our efforts, we and the afghan president continue to in the size the importance of infelicity -- inclusivity. we must link local governments to the financial resources in kabul. much more needs to be done to help the afghan government assume that at the responsibility for addressing the concerns and needs of afghan citizens. the national consultant of
peace was a constructive step in this effort. it provided a chance for the afghan president to address concerns that fuelled the insurgency and to promote local reintegration to contribute to a political resolution of some of the issues that exist. the meeting that he consulted -- conducted on sunday also added to this effort. another critical part of our joint military campaign is promoting and constructive development. we are seeing improvement in the government's ability to deliver basic services like education and basic health care. this has positively effect in other areas, including security.
we have worked with the international committee and the international government. we are now embarking on a project plan developed by the government of afghanistan and various u.s. agencies to dramatically increase production of electricity for the kandahar area and parts of southern and eastern afghanistan. to complement this effort, we also promote agriculture and economic programs to help afghans bring legitimate crops to market instead of continuing to grow poppy. as the members of this committee recognizes, this is using important to the region and our country. we're doing all that we can to achieve progress and accomplishments of our imported
-- are important objectives in afghanistan. i want to thank the members of this committee once again for your unwavering support. thank you very much. but that you very much, general. we will try a first round. >> general, let me start with an issue i raised regarding the army not being in the south where the major fighting is taking place. as i understand, we have approximately 94,000 u.s. troops in afghanistan. about half of them are deployed in kandahar and in the south. how many troops are they in
kandahar and how many afghan troops do we expect will be there in september? >> mr. chairman, i would be happy to get that for you for the record. if i could rather just provide the overview of what it is that we are trying to accomplish in that area. you have touched on the importance of getting the afghans in the lead.
we are discussing what is coming to kandahar province. >> how often do these operations -- how often will there be afghan troops in the lead? >> with respect to the police, they are in the lead in kandahar. the afghan civil order police will be in the lead. there will not be full numbers alongside them. they will be conducting the operations. >> when the regular army -- do
are the troops capable of leading those high end operations? >> we have afghan partners on the high and operations. i am talking about the very high and operations. they are not meeting the very height and. those are dependent on u.s. reconnaissance. they do not have the ability to pull that down, neither does virtually any other force in the
world, for that matter. what is probably more relevant would be more of the standard activities. the standard patrols, i think they have the capability to do and are doing. they do secure large numbers of convoys of various movements, the presence, the patrols, the frameworks of activities. when you get into the more challenging some areas in the more difficult operations, u.s. forces in depleting the bulk of those. -- were leading to the bulk of those. >> let me ask you to you support the mission of the president. it has additional forces coming in. do you continue to support the july 2011 date for the start of a reduction in u.s. forces from afghanistan?
>> i support the policy of the president, and mr. chairman. as i have noted on the number of occasions, my sense of what the president was seeking to convey at west point in december were two messages. one was a message of enormous additional commitment. it culminated in more than tripling the number of u.s. forces. we will triple the number of civilians with substantial additional funds that you have authorized for the afghan security forces. there is also a message of urgency. the message was the to die -- july 2011 peace. that is the beginning of the process for transition. it is conditions-based. it is the beginning of a process of responsible drawdown of u.s. forces. >> you say that you continue to support the president's policy, both in terms of the additional troops and the setting of the
date to begin the reduction for the reasons that you just gave in terms of laying out the urgency for the afghans to take responsibility. does that represent more best personal, professional judgment? >> in a perfect world, mr. chairman, we have to be very careful with time lines. we went through this in a rock -- iraq, as you will recall. i did ask to set a time line ultimately in iraq. testifying in 2007, i said we would start the drawdown of the surge forces in december, based on a projection of conditions that would be established. we are assuming that we will
have those kinds of conditions that will enable us by that time in july of 2011 -- that is the projection. that is what we have supported. >> do i take that to be a qualified yes, no, or non- answer? >> is a qualified yes, mr. chairman. i think there was a nuance to what the president said that was very important that did not imply a race for the exits, a search for the light to turn off, or anything like that. it did imply the need for greater urgency. that was aimed at a number of targets. it included the leaders in afghanistan. it undoubtedly included some of our partners around the world. it may have included some of us
in uniform. >thank you. senator mccain? >> there is a great deal of confusion about this. you just said beginning the withdrawals would be conditions- based and contingent upon certain factors. there is a recent that basically quotes and says "inside the oval office, president obama asked david petraeus whether you could do this in 18 months. sir, i am confident that we can train and hand over to the a.n.a. in that timeframe," general petraeus replied. the president replied that if you cannot do we use a and 18 months, no one is going to suggest that we stay. there was agreement on that. he goes on to say that obama was
trying to turn the tables on the military to box them in after they had spent most of the boxing him and. if after 18 months, the conditions in afghanistan stabilized, then the troops could begin to come home. if the conditions did not stabilized enough to begin an orderly withdrawal of u.s. forces or if they deteriorated further, that would undermine the pentagon's belief in the effectiveness of more troops. at the conclusion of an extra field in his west wing office, referring to vice president biden, he was adamant that in july of 2011, he will seek a lot of people moving out. you can bet on it. i do not know if that book is adequate. it does have quotations in it. -- i do not know of the book is accurate.
it does have quotations in it. there is a disconnect between the comment you just made in response to the chairman and what is being depicted here in the president's repeated statements that in july of 2011, we will begin withdrawal. this obviously since a message to our enemies that we are leaving and to our friends that we are leaving. there is accommodation in the region. could you clarify the difference between what you just said and what is quoted in the book? these are direct quotes. it says the recall did weaken train and hand over to the a.n.a. in that timeframe. if you cannot do it, no one is going to suggest that we stay. that is apparently a direct quotation from the president of the united states.
>> i am not sure it is productive to comment on conversations that took place in the oval office. >> i and stand up. >-- i understand that. >> i would come back to what the president said at west point. that is something that i support, as i just told the chairman. that is that july of 2011 is not the date where we race for the exits. it is the date where, having done an assessment, we begin a process of transition of tasks to afghan security forces based on conditions. we begin a process of a responsible drawdown of our forces. >> do you believe that we will begin a drawdown a forces in july of 2001? that is given the situation this exists -- as it exists today.
>> it is not given as conditions exist today. it is given as projections at that time. i do believe that is the case. >> you believe we will begin a drawdown in july of 2011 under the projected plans that we have? >> that is the policy. i support it. >> i understand that you support the policy. conditions on the ground indicate that we will begin a withdrawal? in the words of the vice president, in july of 2001, he will see a lot of people moving out -- bet on it. do you agree with the comment of president karzai's former intelligence chief that karzai has lost confidence in the ability of the united states and nato to succeed in afghanistan?
>> i do not. as i mentioned earlier, we just did a weekly video teleconference with general mcchrystal. he spent most of sunday with general karzai -- with karzai conducting the council in canada are -- kandahar. in the process, there was no sense on the part of general mcchrystal nor on those of the others with him that there was a lack of confidence in the united states commitment to afghanistan. as i mentioned earlier, the fact that we have more than region will have more than tripled our forces from january of 2009 to the end of august of 2010 is of enormous significance. it is the same with the civilian
force structure, the same with funding, and the same with others. >> let me reiterate my admiration and respect for you and our military leaders and the difficulty of the task before them. i think you are one of america's great heroes. but i continue to worry a great deal about the message we are sending in the region about whether we are going to stay or not and whether we are going to do what is necessary to succeed rather than set an arbitrary time line -- timeline. [unintelligible] >> we are going to recess now for a few moments.
>> my apologies. i gotta little bit like headed. it was not senator mccain's questions. [laughter] a just got dehydrated. >> you told us your more than ready to go. you always are. you are that kind of incredible person. i have consulted with colleagues. we are going to overrule you. we're not going to continue today. >> are they in control of the military action? [laughter] >> we would feel better about it. we will try to continue tomorrow morning. we think my clock is fine. you look great. we would feel better. -- we think that 9:00 is fine.
you look great. we would feel better. we thank both of you. >> i would finish the thought i had when general petraeus delta little ill. you are one of america's greatest heroes. we're glad you are recovered. we look forward to seeing you again tomorrow. >> we all feel better. i know you feel better, but we all feel better doing it this way. we will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning tentatively at 9:00. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]
>> general david petraeus return for a second day on the hearing of the withdrawal plan and upcoming offensive in the afghan city of kandahar. >> we're glad to welcome back to the witnesses. let me reiterate the great appreciation of this committee for your service and sacrifices that you and your families make along the way. the demands of your positions are great.
you carry out your duties with excellence. thank you to you both. general petraeus, you were more than willing and able to proceed yesterday morning. it was my abundance of caution that led me to adjourn the proceedings until this morning. before i turn to senator mccain, who still has a bit of his time remaining, i understand that general petraeus has a storshort statement. >> again, thank you for the opportunity of a redo during after demonstrating yesterday the importance of following the orders of my first platoon sergeant 35 years ago to always stay hydrated. i will try to remember that in the future. my team provided me this nifty camera about -- camel back to remember it. [laughter] i would point out that the committee does provide water. thank you for the cookies in the
waiting room. i would like to ensure that my answers to questions by you and senator mccain on the july 2011 date are very clear. as i noted yesterday, i did support and agreed at the end of the president's decision-making process last fall with the july 2011 date described by the president as the point at which the process begins to transition security tasks to afghan forces at a rate to be determined by conditions at the time. i also agreed with july 2011 as the date at which is responsible drawdown of the surge forces is scheduled to begin, at a rate to be determined by the conditions at the time. as i noted yesterday, i did believe there was value in sending a message of urgency as well as the message the president was sending a commitment with the additional, substantial numbers of forces.
it is important that july 2011 be seen for what it is, the date when a process begins, based on conditions. it is not the date when the u.s. has for the exits. moreover, my agreement with the president's decisions were based on projections of conditions in july 2011. needless to say, we're doing all humanly possible to achieve those conditions. we appreciate the resources provided by congress to enable us to do that. we will also conduct rigorous assessments throughout the year and as we get closer to next summer, as we do periodically in any event, to determine where adjustments in our strategy are needed. as july 2011 approaches, i will provide my best military and vice to the secretary and to the president on how i believe we should proceed based on the conditions at that time. i will then support the president's decision.
providing ones forthright advice as a sacred obligation that military leaders have to men and women in uniform. i know that is what the president expects and wants his military leaders to provide as well. beyond that, in response to some of your questions yesterday, i want to be very clear as well that i fully recognize the importance of afghan security forces leading in operations. the formation of a nato training mission afghanistan, the many initiatives is pursuing, and the vastly increased partnering ordered by general mcchrystal are intended to help the afghan forces achieved the capability to take the lead in operations. to that end, i think we should note that afghan forces are in the lead in kabul and in a number of other areas and missions. they're very much in the flank throughout the country. so much that their bosses are usually several times u.s. losses. our afghan comrades on the ground are indeed sacrificing
enormously for their country, as are of course our troopers and those of our partner nations. thank you. >> thank you. i am glad to hear of your support for the july 2011 beginning of u.s. troop reductions. i continue to strongly believe it is essential for success in afghanistan for everyone to understand the urgency for the afghans to take responsibility for their own security. after calling upon senator mccain to complete his questions, i will be calling on senators for questions in the early bird order established yesterday morning. i believe we notified all of our members' offices of that yesterday afternoon. senator mccain. >> we were interrupted at probably the most important one
of my comments yesterday when i said that i considered to be one of america's greatest histories. in case you missed that, i will repeat it. >> it was overwhelming, sir. [laughter] >> i still believe that with all of my heart. i appreciate the statement that you just made, general petraeus. i think it is very helpful. i hope it is heard in the oval office and in the vice president's office. your statement seems to contradict what the president of the united states continues to say, what his spokesperson said that july of 2011 was "etched in stone." the administration officials continue to say that july of 2011 will begin a withdrawal. according to what is probably trash journalism, a vice-
president biden said in july of 2011, you are going to see a whole lot of people moving out, bet on it. it would be very helpful if your sentiments were shared by the president, the vice president, the president's national security adviser, and others. right now, we are sounding an uncertain trumpet to our friends and enemies. they believe that we're leaving as of july 2011. i could relate to you anecdotes all the way down to the tribal chieftain level in afghanistan. it seems to me that organizations and countries and leaders in the region are accommodating to that eventuality.
that does not bode well for success in afghanistan. i guess it is more than a comment that i make, and elaboration on the comment i made yesterday. if we sound an uncertain trumpet, not many will follow. that is what is being sounded now. that is one of the reasons why we see some of the events taking place in the region. they're not just confined to afghanistan. i know i have used up most of my time. maybe general petraeus would like to respond. >> first of all, i think july of 2001 and is etched in stone. i tried to explain it as a date at which the process begins that is based on conditions. i think that was explained clearly at the speech at west point by the president, which i was privileged to attend. as i said yesterday, i do not
think it is productive to discuss journalistic accounts of oval office conversations, based on second and third-hand sources, other than to say that i think it is important that folks know those are not complete accounts. i will leave it there. i have tried to understand -- is clean my understanding of what july of 2011 means and how it is important that people realize, especially our partners and comrades in arms in afghanistan in the region, that is not the date when we look for the door and try to turn off the light. it is rather a date at which the process begins. i would like to ask the undersecretariat she wants to provide some insights, having participated in the process as well. >> thank you. i think general petraeus has characterized the date accurately. it is an inflection point. it is a point at which the end of the surge will be marked in
the process of transition that is based on conditions will begin. the president was a very careful not to set a detailed timeline of how many troops will come out and at what point in time. he believes in a conditions- based process. he said that over and over again. on the issue of whether or not afghans understand our commitment, i think one of the things that we did in the strategic dialogue that we have recently with president karzai and 14 members of his cabinet was to focus on the long term commitment of this country to the afghan people and the development of afghanistan. we talked about long term security assistance, long-term commitments to build capacity. i think everyone walked away with that with no question in their mind about the depth and enduring nature of the u.s. commitment to afghanistan. that has to be an important
context in which this conversation happens. >> thank you, madam secretary. we do not live in a vacuum. i had conversations with them as well. i have had conversations with leaders throughout afghanistan and the region. that is not what they are telling me. >> thank you, senator mccain. senator lieberman. >> your recovery time was very impressive yesterday. the coach may want to add due to the team roster before slovenia later in the week. i thank you both for your service and leadership. i want to say at the outset that as you both said yesterday in your opening statements, in previous appearances before our committee, you made clear that things would get worse before they got better in afghanistan.
unfortunately, that is exactly where we are now. to me, the important point here and i want to go back to the december speech of obama at west point. the president made a very strong case expressing his decision that the outcome of the war in afghanistan was of vital national security interest to the united states and if it went badly, the consequences for our security were disastrous. to me, that is the most important point. we know from previous experience that counterinsurgencies take time. i think the key now is to make sure that we have the right strategy, that it is appropriate
resources to be exercised with full force. we need to give our war fighters and the state department personnel on the ground the time and patience to achieve the strategic national goal that we have of succeeding in afghanistan. i say that to us here in congress as well as to the american people. i think important part of that is the clarification you may just now -- you made just now about what the july of 2011 date means. it is not a deadline for withdrawal. it is not a deadline where we will pick up and go out. it is a goal. i want to stress as you did very clearly here today, notwithstanding anything we may have read and what my dear friend and colleague from arizona has described as trash journalism -- may be trash
journalism -- the fact is that what happens on the ground at that time will determine whether we withdraw any troops from afghanistan in july of 2011. we hope we will be able to. i believe it is important for the president to make that clear at some point soon. notwithstanding all of the cold -- clarifications that followed from him, secretary gates, secretary clan, and the two of you, and our conversations with people in the region, that date is being read as the date at which the united states will begin to pull out, regardless of what is happening on the ground. thank you for your clarification of that this morning. i want to ask this question.
some of us on the committee were talking about this afterward. there has been a run of bad reporting from afghanistan over the last couple of weeks. the marines marja, -- marines took marja, but there has been fighting back. there have been the headings. general mcchrystal announced last friday that the offensive in kandahar is now being delayed. the report should be in your opening statement yesterday were quite upbeat about what is happening in afghanistan. i fear that there is a gap between the tone and the message that you gave us yesterday and what we're reading in the media about what is happening. i would like you to address that. that gap can begin to erode the support that you need from members of congress and the american people in the months ahead.
>> senator, i think you have raised a very important point. that is the importance of having measured expectations. the conduct of a counterinsurgency operation is a roller-coaster experience. there are setbacks as well as areas of progress or successes. it is truly an up and down when your living and doing it, even from afar. in my view, the trajectory has generally been upward, despite the tough losses and setbacks. when i appeared before u.s. some months ago for the foster care hearing, a coalition soldier could not have set foot in marcja. i did that just a month and half ago with the district governor. there was not a district
governor at that time. there's gradually the expansion of government activities in the form of schools and assistance to revive markets. it is even in the form of nascent judicial systems tied into local organizing structures as well. that is very important. in kandahar, we bought. in the market. i did have security around me, but i have hundreds of afghans and around me as well. p bought the bread directly from them and talked to them while we ate it. this is an up and down process. that defines the experience of counter insurgency. there is no hell that you can take and plant the flag and then go home to a victory parade. -- there is no hill that you
can plant a flag in ending go home to a victory parade. we were hearing was about certain activities. that all the sudden, we expanded our forces into an area. iraqi forces were starting to stand up in certain areas. that is the case again in certain areas of afghanistan. i think it is essential that we realize the challenges in this kind of endeavor. it is also essential that people do realize there has been progress, but there have clearly also been setbacks. beyond that, i would like to reiterate what you said as a designation of vital national security interest. that is a code word and sign of commitment. that is a rhetorical statement that means an enormous amount. again, i appreciate your mentioning that. it does highlight what i was discussing earlier.
>> do you want to add something, secretary? >> i agree with what general petraeus said about counterinsurgency campaigns been a roller-coaster ride. the overall trajectory is moving in the right direction. it is going to be hard. there will be times when we take one step back and two steps forward. one thing i wanted to give as an example is that i do think the reporting on the delay in the kandahar campaign has been overplayed. we talked yesterday about the importance of the afghans taking the lead. i think we of general mcchrystal the degree -- a great degree of operational flexibility. in kandahar, he is taking more time to shape the operation. the campaign has already begun. the shaping is happening now. what president karzai conducted
on sunday was very important for him to step up and take the lead, the ownership of what is going to happen in canada are -- kandahar. if that means delaying some aspects to make sure the afghan ownership and leadership is in place, then we should all be supporting that. that is not a sign of failure. it is a sign of good counter- insurgency strategy. >> we probably should distribute what was published as president karzai's talking points. it makes a number of these points. this is the president acting as a commander in chief. >> that would be very important. thank you. >> madam secretary, i share the concern of both of the previous questioners of the exit
strategy and a date certain. i was relieved when the president made his speech. he said that just as we have done in iraq, we will execute the transition responsibly taking into account conditions on the ground. that is the position i wanted him to take. i was relieved to hear that. i have only heard it once. i have staff go back yesterday and check and see if they have seen any emphasis on that by the president. i would recommend that be done, that he keeps saying it, that the administration and others do. that clarifies it. it makes it very clear. without that and only having said it wants, i think there is a little bit of a problem there. let me ask you a question, general petraeus. you have heard me talk about this before.
you know i have a very strong feeling about a certain program. you talked about in your opening comments. we have a certain program from the budget that came from the president. it was the $1.3 billion. and respect this committee for doing what they thought was the right thing. i disagreed with that. it lowered it. it takes the amount that goes to afghanistan from $1.1 billion down to $800 million. i would like to ask your feelings about that. how valuable is the program? how would you use it? the second part of the question is about when the secretary said the general mcchrystal needed more flexibility. i think we need that in this
program. in my last trip over there, we're talking about the needs. something needs to be done fast with the power stations and. . there are restrictions because of the statute. the money cannot necessarily be spent on these types of projects. the second part of the question would be if we need to change the language to be able to accomplish these things that people in the field told me that we should be spending on? >> thank you for that. the president has described what you have quoted him on a number of different occasions. i would go back to the west point speech in particular. the very important words " responsible drawdown" were used. dislike vital national interest, that has been a code word for us who went through the iraqi policy review. at the end of that, the president announced the
responsible drawdown. we are in the process of doing that. we think this is on track and will be at the 50,000 number by the end of august. with respect to afghanistan, we do need the full amount. it is very valuable. as i mentioned in my opening statement yesterday, we now have the inputs just about right. we have another 9000 troopers to get on the ground with its nato partners as well. as we get everyone into position and outperforming their tasks -- and out performing the tasks, taking away the sanctuary, and capitalizing on that, it is critical to that process. someone may ask why the obligation rate this year insofar as low. that is in part because we're
still building up. we're doing many more projects. their lower-cost. that is another issue. beyond that, we do indeed have projects that are stacked up. we have just submitted them. osd is working on this. i will let the secretary talked about these projects for electrification in particular in the kandahar and other regions. >> we think surf is an absolutely critical counterinsurgency tool. we would urge you to consider restoring the funding that was removed. in the specific case of the electrical projects in canada are, it is a critical element of the fight. -- in the specific case of the electrical projects in kandahar, it is a critical element of the fight.
the projects have been developed in close coordination with the bridging strategy that would eventually handoff to longer- term development efforts. cent, has submitted the proposals. they are being removed. --centcom has submitted proposals. they are being reviewed. we do not think this point the language needs to be changed. our reading of the language suggests that the flexibility is there to do this kind of thing. >> we're running out of time. i would suggest that this is information that i got from the field, that there are things we are restricted from using. perhaps for the record, if you could both elaborate on that and maybe send us something. i have a hard time answering this when i talk to people. the talk about a surge being successful in a rock -- they talk about the surge being
successful in iraq. we're now looking at a surge that might be about 100,000 troops and talking about nine months. considering afghanistan is about twice the size of barack -- iraq, it is hard for me to explain to people why this number will work in afghanistan when it took so much more in iraq. do you have anything to share? >> i do. thank you. with respect on the timing of the actual search in a riraq, we had all of the surge forces on the ground in june or july. we began the drawdown of the first brigade in december. we did links in and out over the course of the next spring. d-- we did all links than that out over the courss of the next spring.
on the ground, by the end of august. the july of 2011 date is when the process begins when we would embark on the response will draw down of the serb forces. that is a considerable period of time. with respect to the density of forces, you have a situation in afghanistan where there are a number of places that do not require substantial numbers of coalition forces. there are areas where the afghans are very much in the lead. this is about counterinsurgency mathematics. we think we will have the density when we get the additional forces on the ground. we will be able to ramp up the afghan forces by about one had to thousand -- by about 100,000 by the fall of 2011. >> thinks senator inhofe's
comments reflect those of this committee. we reduced the funding in afghanistan because you are on track in afghanistan to spend only $200 million for this entire year of the billions that we appropriated last year. for the record, please explain to us why the request was for $1.1 billion and why the reduction to $800 million would have a negative impact. i do think what the senator said is reflective of this committee is very strong support for the program. your answer to that question for the record would be helpful for us as we proceed in this budget. >> thank you for the
clarification. i think everybody on the committee does fully supported. -- fully support it. think everybody on the committee does fully support it. good morning to both of you. general, we all on understand this is an important time in afghanistan. and i think it would be useful to be able to consider president karzai a reliable partner. it's sometimes hard to understand what he says versus what he does and vice verz sa. i had a couple of questions in that regard. how do you best explain what seemingly is his material personality, one day he talks about common causes with the taliban and then another day goes down to kandahar and pleads residents to cooperate in the upcoming fight. and then secondly, i had a chance to get to know minister atmar and had great respect for his talent and his vision. what do you think his departure might mean for the important,
maybe even crucial, police training effort? >> thanks senator. on the first question i think there are a number of explanations, if you will. first of all, perhaps political leaders occasionally differentiate their message a tiny bit, depending on who the audience might be. i think that would never happen in our own country, but i think over there that occasionally happens. second thing is, this is a tough fight. and leaders are under enormous pressure. i can tell you that having dealt with leaders throughout our region, and having dealt with leaders in iraq at various times who were similarly under enormous, perhaps even greater pressure, is just staggering levels of violence in iraq over the years that we were there
prior to the downturn. again, this can lead individuals at times to have outbursts or to express frustrations. and i think there's a bit of that that is understandable. now, with respect to the president accepting the resignation of the minister of -- former minister of interior, someone, indeed, that we all really knew quite well, have worked with, not just as a minister of interior, but in two previous ministry positions, as well. and one who, again, has impressed all of us, i think the impact of the departure cannot be determined, needless to say, until we know who the replacement is. there are discussions going on, you should know, that coalition leaders are certainly included in those discussions. which i think is a positive feature of the process but at
the end of the day, certainly this will be the decision of the president of a sovereign country. but if the candidates that we think are under consideration provide the ultimate next minister, then i think that the ministry will continue forward on a positive projectry. >> so you're guardedly optimistic that there will be a replacement with whom we could work and who will bring the same sort of focus and expertise? >> that's correct, senator. i would not rule out again seeing minister ottmar back in another capacity, either. >> that's heartening to hear. if i might let me move to the very fascinating report over the weekend that deputy undersecretary of defense paul brinkley issued on the mineral and natural resource wealth of afghanistan. it's tied to military task force, the task force for business and stability operations and you may know the
chairman and i teamed up to offer an amendment in the defense authorization act that authorizes that task force to work in afghanistan. the amendment also, general, will ask for report from the dod and the state department to look at the promising sectors in afghanistan's economy, assess their capabilities of the government to generate additional revenue, to work on infrastructure needs and so on. we're hopeful this report will provide important information that will enable afghanistan to attract investment and pursue new economic opportunities. i'd trbed to hear your thoughts on the task force work, and more generally about these economic development opportunities. and the undersecretary may want to respond, as well. >> well, first of all, if i could just say that deputy undersecretary paul brinkley, in the task force stability operations did phenomenal work in iraq. it was really created initially, in fact, to our request at that time, that someone try to get
some business leaders back in to iraq. it was a land of extraordinary opportunity, but also at that time, a land of extraordinary violence. but you had to look out over the horizon. you had to envoice a world where the violence was reduced, and business could begin to flourish again, given the extraordinary potential that iraq has in terms of its energy resources, natural water, agriculture, and a variety of other blessings, including human capital. and he was able to bring in business leaders at a time when no business leader in his right mind would come in on his own. we flew them around, secured them, housed them, fled them and everything else. and over time, this led to some very big deals, actually. for american business, but also in some cases for some other businesses, as well. because we did indeed open more widely than that. but some very, very big transactions that iraq needed. in fact, this is at a time when prime minister maliki specifically was asking me as a
military commander if i could get a certain corporation to re-engage after their earlier disappointing experience there. and get another one, in the electrical sector, the oil sector, gas and so forth. again deputy undersecretary brinkley did great work there. so, in fact, i encouraged, and we had help to get him in to afghanistan, we might even look a bit more broadly than that, but, in fact, it was during his process of getting acquainted with the situation on the ground in afghanistan that these geological surveys and other documents were all pulled together, and i think people realize the magnitude of the mental resources that exist in afghanistan. recognizing the enormous challenges to actually turning those in to wealth and income and so forth for the people, revenue. but nonetheless, recognizing extraordinary potential that is there. it has some of the world's last
remaining superdeposits or some other terms, certainly, for environment, lithium, tin, timber, gemstones. it has some coal, it has some natural gas and oil. so, again, they're not super deposits. but it has extraordinary potential. and again, helping business find its way to that in partnership with the military that is trying to create the security foundation on which they can build and operate i think is a very important initiative and i appreciate the committee's support for that particular initiative. that's one of the areas in which we've learned huge lessons in the context of counterinsurgency operations in the last five years or so. >> let me just add that i think that what the picture that's pointed from the u.s. geological survey that was done, which is only a parpgs survey, that under mr. brinkley's sponsorship, really paints a brighter
economic picture for afghanistan midterm and long-term. and it creates at least the prospect of a much more sustainable economy that can actually support some of the capabilities that we are putting in place today, like the armed forces, another government and economic capacity. it also shines a spotlight on the importance of some of our capacity building efforts, particularly with the ministry of mines. which is under new leadership that seems very capable and competent. and we are working very closely with them to try to build their capacity so that this information informs their planning and think sort of get off to the right -- on the right foot in terms of pursuing some of these opportunities, working with businesses, private sector companies from various -- from around the world. so we think this is a bright spot on the horizon, as general petraeus said, it's going to
take a lot of time and effort to build the capacity, and the sort of legal structures and so forth to really take full advantage of this. but we're working along those lines. >> thank you for that elaboration. >> thank you very much senator. thank you for your leadership on this very, very important part of the afghan picture, essential that leadership be there, we're all grateful to you for it. senator brown? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, it's good to see you. in such chipper shape today. and, a lot of cookies back there, which i hope you partaken a couple. when we met in afghanistan, actually, i was aware, we were briefed, in fact, of the mineral and oil and other deposits and it became apparent to me that for one, they have a problem how to get everything out of the earth, one. number two, how to security it and get it from point "a" to point "b."
and number three how to ensure that the corruption that we've seen in afghanistan actually keeps the money in country and has it flow down to the individual citizens. so the challenges, madam secretary, and general, obviously seem great. yes, there is a bright spot, but it also appears to be, how do we get from point "a" to point "b"? do you see a role with the military in anything aside from securing, or what do you think general, in that regard? >> again, the security foundation is the essential component to all of this. without that you can't build the legal regime that's required. you can't combat the corruption that creeps in to these kinds of activities. so it is essential in that regard. we do, indeed, provide an important supporting role to those like the task force for stability operations, a.i.d., some international and nongovernmental ga